The Morsi Code

Though the news out of the Middle East last week was dominated by the shocking car bombing in Beirut, the region also witnessed the beginnings of an important process that will have just as many implications: namely, efforts by the Muslim Brotherhood to implement Islamic (shari’ah) law in Egypt’s new constitution. For a politician heralded as moderate in the elections six months ago, President Muhammad Morsi appears surprisingly willing to adopt strict Quranic principles as the basis for Egypt’s legal and governmental systems. But are we really witnessing a return to radicalism, which many feared possible when the Brotherhood was elected – or are there other factors at play in this constitutional conundrum?

Since its founding, the Brotherhood has been considered a radical Islamist faction by many Western leaders. In last week’s foreign policy debate, GOP candidate Mitt Romney perpetuated this idea by implying a connection between the Brotherhood and “Al Qaeda-type individuals.” This way of thinking tends to assume the worst about political groups with Muslim roots, and is no way to conduct foreign policy in the Middle East. Such attitudes alienate moderate Islamist groups like the Brotherhood, and push them towards more radical factions. Politicians who do not believe Islamist groups have the capacity for fair governance create resentment within these groups, and this doubt ends up being a self-fulfilling prophecy. The US can therefore blame itself, in part, for the seeming increase in radicalism within the Brotherhood.

Another disturbing cause of the Brotherhood’s apparent trend towards radicalism are the recent riots over the lack of conclusive policies coming out of Morsi’s first hundred days in office. Many Egyptians actually have a list of everything then-candidate Morsi promised he would do upon getting elected, and are protesting that the president has only fulfilled a certain, very low number of them (they disagree on the exact amount). These protests are sending a message to the Brotherhood, which appears to feel compelled to take decisive action to garner support from its constituents. Public focus on the “First Hundred Days” is not unique to Egypt (it is particularly intense in the US); when intense pressure is applied to politicians within such a short span of time, it results in hasty and ill-advised policies implemented in an effort to placate the population. President Morsi is the first democratically-elected president Egypt has seen in many years, and it will take a long time for truly effective policies to be passed in a country that lacks solid democratic institutions. The Egyptian public has every right to demand change, but these protestors must be realistic about what the new government is able to achieve, or else even more questionable policies will come to the forefront.

It is true that the largest factor driving the Brotherhood’s recent focus on shari’ah is radical Islamists – but they are not Islamists within the Brotherhood. Rather, it is the Salafists in Egypt who are providing the impetus for the Quran-based constitution. Egypt is not a country new to democracy, but its political sphere has not seen competitive parties for many years. The Brotherhood is now the legitimate political party in power, and must maintain its position by competing successfully with other groups, particularly the more radical Salafists. The reason members of the Brotherhood are focusing so hard on the implementation of shari’ah law is not because they themselves are revealing their true radical selves, but because they are struggling to draw popular support away from the powerful radical party. If the Salafists come to be characterized as the party that stands most strongly for Muslim ideals, then the Brotherhood will look weaker by comparison. The move towards shari’ah is, therefore, a political ploy rather than an ideological crusade, and as such does not indicate any concrete radicalization within the Brotherhood.

Nevertheless, the Brotherhood’s intentions for the new constitution are worrying. Though there are many reasons for the shift besides the group’s alleged emerging radicalism, the mere fact that their actions are so subject to external forces is cause for concern. Though Americans can have a share in remedying this (among other ways, by re-electing President Barack Obama, a politician who has shown singular sensitivity in his dealings with Islamist groups), the choice above all lies with the Egyptian people, and with the Brotherhood itself. For though the US has an interest in seeing fair, liberal democratic institutions take root in the Middle East, this is not an American issue. Only if the populace does not pressure the Brotherhood to pass life-changing policies in a short period of time, and only if the party gives the long road to democracy precedence over immediate political rivalries can true democratic values develop in Egypt. Whether this is realistically possible is yet to be seen; but as the constitutional crisis in Egypt unfolds, it is a slightly comforting thought that the Brotherhood is not inherently radical, and does indeed possess the potential for moderate and fair governance.