Opposites (Don’t) Attract

Most have but a surface-level knowledge of the difference between North and South Dakota, but the parallel does not pull through for North and South Korea, who share little, at best, but their name. Wild differences in economics and political systems are supplemented by a wide cultural divide. So to the Western ear, the desire for reunification seems foreign. How can two nations, so diametrically opposed in almost every dimension, ever be fluidly combined?

Nevertheless, there remains a following in both countries that has promised, time and time again, to move forwards toward a unified Korea. Recently, the ruling South Korean Saenuri Party has followed up on campaign promises of rapprochement with the North. The party’s strategy is colloquially known as “trustpolitik.” President Park Geun-hye of the Saenuri Party engineered the policy, which includes two key steps: a military buildup in the South combined with trust building exercises with the North as well as persistent negotiations with North Korean politicians to set the terms of reunification. As part of the cooperative program with North Korea, President Park has also championed meetings between families separated after the peninsular division at the infamous Korean Demilitarized Zone. The commitment to trustpolitik is indicated by South Korea’s “Reunification Tax,” instituted in the last three years, which seeks to begin the epic task of paying for an imminent reunification by collecting the funds that will be needed for the transition – and that’s no small fee. Generous estimates from the Bank of Korea have the cost under or around $1 trillion USD while the highest estimates approximate it as $5 trillion USD.

All this is to say that South Koreans are still hoping for reunification. In essence, that’s what trustpolitik is about: building the first steps before it happens. The ultimate goal is a united Korea, but there are many ways that could pan out. The Saenuri Party’s vision, however, is basically a gradual China-Hong Kong style regime, which means not just divided-but-conquered political relations, but also integrated economic development. Korea would be highly decentralized yet still unified. It would have two economic and political systems, but there would be limited movement between the two parts, with an increasingly close relationship until a sufficient equalization of capital took place.

This particular model of economic and political integration was first introduced in a now-famous 2009 Goldman Sachs report by economist Goohoon Kwon, which presents a highly optimistic view of the Korean situation, predicting a fairly smooth transition process. However, the report was written in a pre-Kim Jong-un world that was, comparatively speaking, more stable than the terrifyingly factionalized North Korea of today. It’s cheerful representation might not be so accurate today.

It is partially because of this tendency towards an overly positive view that the policy has been criticized in such publications as The Economist, which calls it “distrustpolitik,” but partially because the strategy harkens back to failed policies of South Korea’s past.  The new South Korean strategy threatens to play out as a broken record would, repeating the ultimately failed diplomatic push of the Sunshine Policy – an era under the leadership of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun characterized by policies of food and economic aid to North Korea. However, the Sunshine Policy initiatives lacked any incentives to improve the disastrous human rights issues in North Korea, so the aid garnered little reciprocation for South Korea’s additional policy goals. The failure of the policy is evidenced by the fact that within the past few years, North Korea has violated multiple international laws, ranging from its attempts to launch satellites for thinly veiled military purposes to cancelling planned family reunions. As South Korea begins to repeat the mistakes of the past, it does so as part of a preparation and hope for a bright, but highly unlikely future of peace and unification between the two countries.

One barrier to reunification is the necessary involvement of the rest of the region. Support from Asian neighbors like Japan and China would be necessary if a diplomatic solution were to arise, but historical distrust might make Japan’s ability to successfully leverage influence questionable. Massive anti-Japanese sentiment is widespread in Korea, as highlighted by the tense reactions of the ruling party to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s decision to visit the Yasukuni Shrine in Japan that honors Class A war criminals — many of whom are directly connected to the mass atrocities committed in Korea and China.

And if reunification came about through war, which is not an unreasonable possibility if reunification were to occur, a host of diplomatic problems would accompany all the disastrous – and possibly nuclear – issues involving war itself. The ongoing arms race in Japan and China as well as the remilitarization of Japan presents huge problems going forward if war were to break out. With Japan mulling over a possible policy change allowing for a first-strike policy in North Korea and tensions rising on a daily basis between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the scene is set for a conflict that could involve more than just the Koreas. In a region with the highest population concentration on Earth, this is a scenario that would be best to avoid.

Yet South Korea continues to work towards reunification, and does so with heavy American support. Recently, in a visit to Washington, President Park pointed out the intense closeness of the two nations and highlighted their mutual commitment toward “the implementation of the Korean Peninsula trust-building process.” Indeed, since the division of the peninsula, the main policy goal of the United States in the region has been to unify Korea under a capitalist, democratic government. For decades this seemed possible, but after the great famine of North Korea between 1994-1998, which devastated an already fragile economy and killed an estimated ten percent of the population, the North reached a point from which economic recovery – especially that which would make unification possible – now seems impossible. Furthermore, since the blow, the North has been precariously perched on the breaking point, barely able to sustain its own populations and suffering from an unpredictable and harsh regime.  It is primarily investments from China and aid from the international community that are keeping the country afloat.

Reunification seems like the strategy of the past, yet the West and South Korea are endlessly pushing towards a goal that seems increasingly unreachable. The blame for this neglect to change the flow of the policies may rest on a dearth of truly relatable circumstances. Not only is North Korean policy almost impossible to understand, even for the foremost experts, but there are few parallel divided countries from which to view the two Koreas.

Cold War East and West Germany were divided under similar circumstances to the Koreas, but this analogy could not be any more fallacious; the development of East vs. West Germany and North vs. South Korea took diverging paths. East Germany and West Germany had different regimes, but had nowhere near the level of economic inequality, making reunification simpler, especially when it became clear that one regime was undoubtedly to fall. North Korea might be performing a balancing act, but it is still balanced. Its military prowess gives it the option of continuing to reign if it so chooses, and so far, it has. And the economic gap is significant. The GDPs of South and North Korea constitute a 19:1 ratio, respectively. There may not be a proverbial “tearing down of the wall” in Korea, but without a change of strategy, peace in Asia might be torn down instead.