Japanese Nationalism: Are the Days of Japanese Pacifism Behind Us?

In the years following the end of WWII, Article 9 served to reassure members of the international community of Japanese pacifism, and Japan saw an influx of American aid while enjoying the safety of America’s growing Cold War security umbrella. Japan’s focus on economic growth, trade and diplomatic partnership over its long-held military ambitions was a key factor in Japan’s rise as an economic powerhouse in the 1980s. The Japanese people received the clause with surprising passivity; many even saw it as a positive outcome of a disastrous war, safeguarding future generations from conflict. Since 1945, the Japanese government has stood by an unofficial rule that military spending is not to exceed one percent of GDP. It is in the face of half a century of codified pacifism that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is attempting to reinterpret the Article.

In 2013, Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party voiced its aim of passing constitutional reforms to change the nature of Article 9 and to convert the Self-Defense Force to a National Defense Force. This decision has sent shockwaves around Japan, and the Asian security community as a whole. Faced with widespread opposition, the LDP backtracked and decided to simply reinterpret the article. In Abe’s reading, the article allows for “collective self-defense”, the same ideals that governed Wilsonian peace in between the two World Wars. Though it does not specifically allow Japan to initiate wars with enemies, the reinterpretation allows Japan to use force to defend its allies and not just Japan itself.

In a speech announcing the reinterpretation, Abe claimed that such a change was purely to “contribute to peace in the region and beyond,” calling for a “proactive pacifism” and called for Japan to expand it role in UN missions. Japanese involvement in peacekeeping had been governed by the 1992 Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, which limits Japan’s involvement in these missions to periods of ceasefire, and only with agreement from all parties and minimal use of force. Advocates of Abe’s policies argue that the UN, perpetually in need of more resources, would certainly gain from the added participation of one of the world’s richest countries. If the LDP’s proposed changes pass in the Diet, it seems that Japan may seek a larger role in managing global conflicts.

However, many skeptics, including 55 percent of the Japanese public, worry that the adjustment could lead to a return of Japanese militarism. Arguably, Japanese nationalism has been on the rise for decades, with economic stagnation and growing nationalism forming an eerie parallel to Japan’s trajectory before the Second World War. The reinterpretation is then perhaps the culmination of years of growing Japanese nationalism, reflected in both the government and public. Opposition veteran Kyomi Tsujimoto suggests that the lack of economic growth has resulted in the growing fervor of nationalist sentiment, against historic antagonists China and Korea. Earlier this year the Japanese movie The Eternal Zero, which depicts and glorifies the life of a kamikaze pilot, became the second highest grossing film in the Japanese box office. Xenophobic literature, too, is on the rise. Books like The Theory of Stupid Korea and An Introduction to China: A Study of our Bothersome Neighbors are popular in Tokyo bookstores. However, militarism may not be fait accompli; following Abe’s move to change Article 9, his normally buoyant approval rating dipped to below 50 percent[11].

Japan’s rising nationalism has become both a product and a cause of worsening relations with China. Sino-Japanese tensions are largely due to the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the South China Sea. The bitterness of the spat has already led President Obama to publicly affirm his support for Japan as a long-standing ally, should the need arise. However, actions on both sides have only stoked the conflict. Abe’s provocative offering at the Yasukuni shrine, which houses the remains of Japanese soldiers, including Class A war criminals, has only cemented his image as a rabid nationalist with authorities in Beijing, while China’s aggressive air zone declaration in 2013 has confirmed Tokyo’s worst fears of China designs as a regional hegemon. This fear that clashes with China could escalate into a full-scale conflict is undoubtedly a contributing factor to Japan’s desire to militarize.

So what does this mean for East Asian international relations? The answer is a complex one, and it will take years to truly evaluate its effects on the region. In the short term, it would seem that Japan seeks to play a greater role in UN missions, and if Abe can deliver on his promise of an economic rebirth, Japan may try and take a more active role in global politics. By reinterpreting Article 9, Japan has sent a clear message to other nations (particularly China) that it is not willing to be written off just yet. Its military budget hike will serve as a possible deterrent in the case of an upsurge of hostility, possibly bringing stability to regional politics by counterbalancing the rise in Chinese influence in the region.

However, this view is likely far too prosaic as any growth in the Japanese military will also almost certainly sour relations with other Asian nations. Japan’s legacy in the region means that neighbors will meet any military growth with suspicion and hostility. But concerns over a growing Japanese military presence are not merely international. Members of the Japanese public are also concerned that by taking a more active role in peacekeeping missions, they are making themselves a greater target for terrorism. Japan now stands at a crossroads and its actions in the next few months will be key to understanding its regional ambitions. Although constitutional pacifism may soon be a relic of the past, we can only hope that its legacy will remain a legend for peace in the region.