Nouri al-Maliki’s abdication from the position of Iraqi Prime Minister last month sent shockwaves around the Middle East and the world. Under increasing pressure from his allies in Washington and from elsewhere on the international scene, Maliki relinquished his position, catalyzing a process that will ideally lead to a complete reconstruction of the Iraqi government. Al-Maliki had long relied on the support of United States to bolster his administration in the turbulent aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s downfall and the subsequent chaos that engulfed Iraq. Amid the alarming encroachment of Islamic State forces into Iraqi territory and loudening calls for statehood among Kurdish groups, it became increasingly clear that al-Maliki’s government was doing more to divide Iraq than protect it. His rule, which prioritized the rights of Iraq’s majority Shia Muslims and relegated Sunnis to second-class citizenship, is largely blamed for cultivating an environment in which radical jihadist groups like IS were able to flourish. Al-Maliki’s decision opens a door of opportunity for Iraq to address fundamental and unresolved problems that have existed since the American invasion. Similarly, Washington too has been granted a second chance, and a new approach is being constructed and articulated by many in the academic, journalistic, and policymaking worlds. Proponents of a reevaluation of strategy have recommended that the approach to a post-Maliki Iraq should center on diplomatic solutions rather than military ones; that the United States should prioritize cooperation with Iran; that it should focus on the inclusion of increasingly unilateral Turkey in a regional mediation; and that it should make every effort to include the Kurdish minority as a legitimate negotiator and fighting force.
American involvement in the fight against IS has, at the time of writing, been limited to airstrikes in defense of humanitarian objectives. The high profile rescue of the tens of thousands of Yazidi Kurds trapped on an isolated mountain surrounded by IS fighters has been held up as evidence of the devastating efficacy of these strikes, and further strikes have released the IS grip on the Mosul Dam and Kurdish towns in the north. Humanitarian missions aside, many policy makers have argued that it would be foolish for the American military to further assert itself in Iraq, as this would likely only serve to further destabilize the region. Tired of over a decade of war in the region, the American public has similarly voiced its opposition to any form of prolonged intervention.
The alternative is diplomatic action, though this would find the United States cozying up with some unusual bedfellows. The United States has found the Islamic Republic of Iran to be among the strongest regional supporters in the fight against militant groups like IS. This traditional American adversary has proven a reliable counterterrorism operative in the past; with the United States and Iran now facing similar strategic objectives, rebooting the partnership between the two nations is becoming a more mainstream viewpoint. Unfortunately, traditional Congressional rhetoric towards Iran is lukewarm at best and downright destructive at worst; just last month, a new series of economic sanctions against Iran was announced, flying directly in the face of President Obama’s efforts to negotiate a solution to the nuclear issue. Furthermore, John Kerry recently announced that the United States opposed Iran’s involvement in anything more than a supporting role in the fight against IS. While Iraqi Sunnis will likely feel threatened by Iranian influence in a new government, no arrangement is durable without Iran’s blessing, and a nonsectarian leader is, arguably, a more favorable outcome for that nation than the alternative: full reversion to Sunni leadership in revenge for the Maliki years.
Iran is only one important player in the region, and while they have thus proved themselves reluctant to enter the fray, Turkey also has the potential to play a decisive role in the developing conflict. Currently, the diplomatic relationship between Turkey and Iraq is uncomfortable, owing to Turkey’s unilateral backing of Kurdish groups seeking an independent state in the north of Iraq. While Turkey’s preference is for wide-scale Sunni representation within a new Iraqi government, when tempered with the presence of Shia-sympathetic Iran at the other side of the table, it may well be easier for a true nonsectarian government to materialize. The hope would be that the two competing religious interests would prevent either side from becoming too powerful, potentially forcing them into cooperation and coexistence.
Iraq’s Kurdish population and their Peshmerga militia, backed in part by Iran, have proven invaluable in fighting Sunni militancy and have found themselves the international figureheads for the war on IS. Better equipped and better trained than their Iraqi Army counterparts, the Peshmerga are historically completely immune to extremist infiltration. Though the United States has often failed to live up to its half of bargains in the region, the Kurdish Regional Government in Erbil has proven time and time again that it is willing to ask for American help. It would seem that the Kurds hold the key to beating IS, and a forced temporary halt in relations between Kurdish leaders and Turkey might make them loath to cooperate. In a recent speech, Obama has articulated that he intends to fight the war on IS through allies on the ground, minimizing the commitment of US troops. Maintaining an active alliance with the Kurdish Regional Government would certainly seem to be in America’s best interests. A returning American presence committed to keeping Iraq together, combined with sufficient finesse from Turkey may be enough to bring the Kurds to the negotiating table over the future of a united Iraq – although recent events, including the recapture of the Mosul Dam by Peshmerga forces, seems to favor the burgeoning move for an independent Kurdistan.
Ideally, all this diplomatic maneuvering will lead to one, relatively simple outcome: free and fair Iraqi elections, untethered by meddling from outside actors, including the United States. Decades old regional rivalries and centuries of religious conflict will no doubt continue to impede attempt of unification in Iraq. Washington should, however, learn from its previous mistakes in dealing with the region, and abandon its old routine of military action, hostility towards Iran and broken promises to the Kurds and others.
Congratulations on your first piece, it was a fantastic article. To the point, and very well written…off to an amazing start.