On Christmas Day, 2009, the United States almost suffered another 9/11. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 23-year-old Nigerian, attempted to detonate explosives on board a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. The attack was unsuccessful thanks to faulty planning and passenger intervention, but the fact that the bomber was able to get through security signals that the organization responsible is a credible threat: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP, a Sunni Islamist militant group, operates in the lawless eastern deserts of Yemen and is reportedly seen by Washington as the most active branch of the al-Qaeda network.
The poorest country in the Arab world, with rampant corruption and weak state capacity, Yemen is prime breeding grounds for jihadist recruitment. As the 2009 attempted attack and numerous ensuing acts have demonstrated, the nation is arguably the most important and unstable battleground in the fight against terror. This stems in part from the history of British colonial rule, which divided the nation in two, and the complete mismanagement of the subsequent reunification project. Yemeni politics are also crippled by sectarian strife and dictatorial leadership. Yet, somehow Yemen remains the forgotten edge of the Arab world. As the U.S. media focused on regime changes in Egypt and Libya and civil war in Syria, the fact that Yemen’s longtime ruler was overthrown as well flew under the radar. Yemen’s importance to regional stability is, however, far greater than its respective coverage would suggest, and understanding its issues will help to guide policymaking elsewhere in the region.
The Two Yemens
As with many other Arab states, the roots of Yemen’s entrenched factionalism lie in colonial rule. The British controlled the southern port of Aden and surrounding regions beginning in the mid-19th century, as its strategic location near the mouth of the Red Sea was crucial to Britain’s trade routes with its satellite territories in South Asia. By contrast, the northern part of Yemen declared a constitutional monarchy immediately after being granted independence from the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War II. After a civil war in which the monarchy was deposed and a Nasserist, pan-Arab government took its place, north Yemen became known as the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Meanwhile, in the south, the British were hanging on. Finally, in 1967, a Marxist revolt drove them out of Aden, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, or South Yemen, was formed. The two Yemens coexisted in relative peace for a time, though they did fight a short war in 1972. However, the division of the country had an enduring impact and set the stage for the conflict that ensued. Unification efforts lasted throughout the ‘80s; economic interdependence was the pretense, but mutual distrust and other barriers remained even after the official birth of unified Yemen in 1990. The YAR, for one thing, was ruled by Ali Abdullah Saleh, a tight-fisted autocrat with no tolerance for Marxism; just four years after unification, facing growing unrest in the former South Yemen, Saleh made a destructive decision. Yemeni mujahedeen returning from the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan were dispatched to crush remnants of Marxism in the south. The battle left lasting scars there, calcified the divisions between the two former countries, and most of all, established a precedent of violent jihad that still haunts Yemen today.
Saleh the Strongman
Twenty-one years after the unification of Yemen, Saleh still ruled the country. Covertly supported by the United States for security and stability reasons and propped up by Saudi Arabia as a way to ensure Saudi hegemony on the peninsula, Saleh’s rule further weakened and decentralized Yemen. His jihadist allies from the 1990s had predictably radicalized and formed the first iteration of AQAP; though publicly Saleh denounced the terrorist cell, privately he again employed them, this time to fight the Zaydi Shia Houthi movement. This move was directly engineered by Saudi Arabia, ever fearful that the Houthis are serving as an Iranian proxy on their home turf. The conflict added a sectarian dimension to an already unbelievably fractured environment. In 2011, the Arab Spring reached Yemen’s shores, washing out Saleh’s regime and causing a terrifying power vacuum to erupt within the country. In this context, AQAP strengthened, the United States ramped up airstrikes on the group, and the Houthis retaliated for their years of mistreatment. The Shia paramilitary force seized large swaths of territory including parts of the capital Sana’a last month and forced the sitting prime minister to resign, demanding a candidate be selected with their approval (they succeeded). The future remains decidedly uncertain, as the Saudis will likely not tolerate what they see as an Iranian foothold in their backyard, the United States will further heighten counterterrorism measures because of fears of anarchy, and Yemenis will be caught in the middle of this vicious cycle of violence and instability.
Regional Reverberations
As Yemen deals with this latest round of domestic upheaval, the visible reciprocal relationship between the nation and foreign interventionists remains. World and regional powers have consistently had a negative impact on Yemeni internal affairs, and in turn, Yemen’s problems are hardly confined within its borders. There are numerous parallels between Yemen and other Middle Eastern nations’ struggles: intense regionalism embodied by the north versus south dynamic is reminiscent of Libyan civil strife, and the Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions harken back to Syrian divides. The Islamic State, a powerful terrorist group with international ambitions, has derailed a domestic political order in Iraq in a similar manner as AQAP in Yemen. As a nation that is plagued by all of these different dilemmas, it follows that a “solution” in Yemen could help immensely in shedding light on how to counter terror in the region as a whole.
The first step to a more stable society is loosening the grip of destructive foreign interests. The lessons that can be learned by examining repeated foreign missteps in Yemen are many: Britain’s colonial division, Saudi Arabian and American unflinching backup of Saleh, and Iran’s meddling in the Houthi issue should all have been avoided. Furthermore, if any hope of a resolution exists in this war-weary republic, it will manifest itself through domestic dialogue between the competing factions; perhaps the recent entrance of the Houthis into mainstream political discussion will enable that. Ideally, all Yemenis should form a common front against AQAP, eliminating one of the world’s most active terrorist groups and serving as a model for national integration to the entire Middle East.
First, it’s not that simple. Domestic dialogue between the competing factions, as we have already seen after the completion of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), is not a solution. We have lived through this scenario before. In fact during the NDC both the Houthis and al-Hirak/the Southern Movement boycotted sessions on multiple occasions citing that their demands (such as the right to self-determination for the South) are not being met. Thus it is no wonder that today, months after the end of the NDC, both of these groups are left with no choice but to take advantage of the existing power vacuum to accomplish their needs. This is seen in the mass rallies being held in the South in an attempt to separate from the North and the multiple city takeovers by the Houthis—more recently, the seizure of al-Radma in Ibb and other areas in the country.
Second, in regards to US interference, it is insufficient to focus on “foreign missteps in Yemen” in terms of the American administration’s support of Saleh. Counterterrorism, in the form of a covert drone war, is a key issue. For this reason, you cannot state that “Yemenis should form a common front against AQAP,” when in fact the US’ escalation of the drone war plays a role in fueling both support and sympathy for AQAP—this is especially true in rural areas, where illiteracy, poverty, and drone strikes prevail. For example, the most recent attack on the airport in Sana’a was in response to a US drone strike. By continuing to ramp up airstrikes on AQAP, the US is putting civilians in danger. With every drone strike that kills an innocent Yemeni, AQAP takes advantage of the situation by using Yemen’s tribal-based society to gain support and “legitimacy” in the area. In short, the US counterterrorism model in Yemen, which Obama ironically dubs a “success,” is beyond counterproductive.
If anything, the first step to a more stable society in Yemen not only includes the removal of “destructive foreign interests” but also includes efforts to de-Saleh the Yemeni government, which still includes many loyalists to Saleh—leading to various internal power struggles. Further, the recent appointment of new ministers is a good step; however, the sanctions against Saleh that were announced in November 2014 are too little too late. Overall it’s too simplistic for the author to suggest dialogue and the removal of foreign interests as a solution.