In Libya, the Islamic State yet again rears its head. Though the opening of this new frontier does mark a threatening expansion of ISIL, it is altogether more indicative of the weak Libyan state into which the group has spread. ISIL has easily established itself in the fractured state, but its presence should not be treated in the same manner as in Syria and Iraq, with bombs and air raids. If ISIL is to be driven out of Libya, the Libyans themselves, as well as the international community, must instead focus on addressing the fractured nature of the country and work towards the establishment of a unitary and representative government.
The Islamic State announced its arrival in Libya with the release of a video in which the group barbarously beheaded 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. These killings invoked the Egyptian government to promise to “avenge the bloodshed and to seek retribution.” Soon after, Egyptian air strikes on ISIL strongholds were launched, killing an estimated 40 to 50 individuals in ISIL controlled areas. This response achieved little in regards to pushing the Islamic State out of Libya or addressing Libya’s weak state capacity.
On March 5, as Tripoli recovered from the most recent bombings, UN-sponsored talks were launched in Rabat in an attempt to reconcile the two rival Libyan governments, the Council of Deputies in Tobruk and the New General National Congress. Both governments claim legitimacy as Libya’s central governmental power and have hitherto refused to negotiate. Nonetheless, according to Bernardino León, the Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, (UNSMIL) “There is a sense, of, if it’s not optimism, at least a sense that it is possible to make a deal, and that is something very important because in the last months, this was not the case.”
The resumption of talks may signal a renewed effort at diplomacy and addressing the structural issues at hand. And, despite Egyptian President El-Sisi’s calls to launch an international military intervention force, diplomacy and assistance represent the ultimately best means by which the rest of the world can assist Libya.
Post-Revolution Libya
In 2011, the Arab Spring saw the rise of mass protests throughout Libya against the dictatorship of Muammar Qaddafi, calling for his ouster and a more representative government. With the help of a NATO bombing campaign in October 2011, the interim government established after the fall of Qaddafi, the National Transition Council (NTC), declared Libya to be “liberated” and announced plans to hold democratic elections. However, since the overthrow of Qaddafi, Libya has yet to find its footing.
In March 2014, the General National Congress, which took over from the initial transitional government, voted to establish the Council of Deputies (also known as the House of Representatives) to replace itself, all amidst rising public discontent with the government. Elections were held soon after. Both the low turnout rate and the high numbers of elected Federalists and Nationalists, in comparison to the 30 percent of seats gained by Islamic groups, gave rise to renewed protests and violence particularly amongst Islamic political groups and militias.
In May 2014, General Haftar of the Libyan National Army, affiliated with the Council of Deputies, launched attacks in operation “Libyan Dignity” against the terrorist group Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi. This group is considered a powerful Islamic militia faction, and is also thought to be responsible for the murder of the US Ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens, in that city in 2012. The “Libyan Dignity” campaign launched a civil war, causing Islamist political groups and militias to unite as a movement called “Libya Dawn” against an increasingly alienated government in Tobruk. The Libya Dawn launched an offensive in the eastern region of the state, eventually captured Tripoli in August 2014 and established a new, autonomous government.
Today, Libya remains divided between the two powerhouses: the New General National Council in Tripoli, and the internationally recognized Council of Deputies government in Tobruk. Both governments have their own infrastructure, including separate central banks and parliaments, and each control 10 percent of Libyan land. The rest of Libyan territory falls into the hands of small religious and tribal-based militias, many of which are loosely affiliated with either one of the governments.
International Intervention
The 2011 revolution and armed conflict that removed Qaddafi from power was capped by a NATO-led air assault on the leader’s power centers in Libya. These air raids proved highly effective and significantly contributed to the overthrow of the Qaddafi dictatorship. Nonetheless, the intervention was criticized for overstepping its mandate as stipulated in UN Resolution 1973 and the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine. What is perhaps more damning are the conditions in which NATO forces left Libya. The involvement of interventionist forces fundamentally altered the dynamics of power in Libya, both between Qaddafi, the opposition, and within the opposition itself, resulting from the favoring of specific rebel groups. Such changes in governance and leadership were not responsibly monitored. At the end of the NATO intervention, Libya was left to reorganize on its own.
The only main international force still in Libya today is UNSMIL, which established operations in March 2014. It has hitherto had little success in uniting the competing Libyan factions to form a unified government. However, the most recent round of UN talks in Rabat are promising in that both rival governments are willing to partake in dialogue, a feat thought unthinkable only a month ago.
2011’s intervention should not be repeated. Instead, the international community must support UNSMIL in its effort to reconcile the two rival governments. Moreover, the covert roles of other states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia in funding militias and launching bombing campaigns, particularly against the Libya Dawn government in Tripoli, must end. Instead an international response such as that taking shape in the form of the UN talks in Rabat must further materialize. To reinforce the legitimacy of these talks, other institutions such as the European Union, African Union (highly critical of the 2011 NATO intervention) and the Arab League must too play roles.
ISIL should not be fought in Libya as it has been in Syria and Iraq. Instead, the Libyan government itself must address the presence of the Islamic State, together with the support of the international community. The recent airstrikes launched by Egypt should not serve as the international community’s response, and the calls of El-Sisi for military intervention should not be heeded. ISIL has festered in the cracks of Libya’s highly fragmented state. Instead of further widening such divides through military intervention, these fractures must fast be addressed.