After more than four years of violence, the Syrian Civil War is as much of a proxy struggle between major international actors as it is an internal conflict. The involvement of external parties — namely Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States — has transformed what was an already complicated battle, between the Syrian government and a myriad of rebel groups, into an international chess match. One of the most controversial pieces on the board is Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad. Assad is responsible for gross misuses of power and the brutal killings of his own citizens. Yet Assad also functions as a lens into the motivations of the international actors involved in the war. Where nations stand in relation to the Syrian president often reveals the political, economic, and religious motivations for their policy in the region.
Iran’s relationship with Assad embodies this reality. Even though 74 percent of the Syrian population prior to the start of the war were Sunni Muslims, Assad and his family, who have led Syria since 1971, are Alawites, a minority Shia population. They have long enjoyed the support of Iran, home to 40 percent of the world’s Shia population and a country with a strong interest in maintaining Shia influence in a Sunni-dominated Middle East. What’s more, as a theocracy, Iran’s religious identity shapes its policies. Some political hardliners in Iran have gone as far to say that the Syrian Civil War is in fact Iran’s own conflict because it embodies Western and Sunni efforts to reduce Shia power in the region. Iran’s close connection with Assad is further confirmed by international recognition of Iran as Assad’s strongest ally, both directly in relation to the conflict, and in preserving its security in the region. Yet the nature of Iran’s involvement isn’t simply defensive. Part of the country’s goal is to actively consolidate its long-term authority in the Middle East. So far, this has meant unabashed political and military support for Assad. However, two major tactical shifts seem to indicate that the state may be reshaping its strategy for achieving this goal.
The first shift is one of military strategy: Iran has recently increased both the “quantity and quality” of its military presence in Syria. Beyond its material and logistical support of the Assad regime, there are significant speculations about the deployment of both common soldiers and high-ranking generals from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps — a faction of the Iranian armed forces specifically aimed at protecting Iran’s theocracy. While this recent show of military fervor might suggest a clear affirmation of support for the Assad regime, Iran continues to fund and support Shabiha militias that support the current government but are not specifically under the purview of Assad. In fact, Iran appears to be deploying greater numbers of the IRGC in order to support for the pro-regime paramilitary group known as the Syrian National Defense Forces.
These strategies suggest that Iran’s underlying goal is not simply to keep Assad in power, but rather to maintain its ability to project power in the region. As calls for Assad’s ouster continue to grow in the international community, Iran is developing a contingency plan in the case that it should feel compelled to pick a side that will ultimately better serve its long-term interests. While Iran has a well-established relationship with Assad, it also has a number of important external priorities in Syria. For example, Iran needs access to Lebanon in order to aid Hezbollah in its fight against Israeli and American influence in the Middle East. While Assad has catered to this interest, keeping Assad in power and maintaining Iranian influence in Lebanon are not mutually inclusive. And so while Iran continues to support Assad, in turn reaping the potential benefits of that relationship, it has also recognized other interests as potentially independent from the current Syrian regime.
The second shift is Iran’s changing diplomatic involvement in the war. Specifically, emerging ambiguities in Iran’s political actions and rhetoric reflect the first steps in a tentative shift from an Assad-dependent strategy in favor of pursuing longer-term influence in the region. Several events hint at a change in Iranian foreign policy — a pragmatic acknowledgement that relying on military influence in the area is insufficient in securing long-term strategic interests. The first instance takes the form of contradictory comments from officials on Assad’s role in a future Syrian government. Some members of the government have recently acknowledged that Iran does not consider discussion of Assad’s separation from Syria to be completely off the table-the stance which has previously defined Iran’s position. Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian recently commented that Iran would not back Assad “forever”. While the minister’s statement is far from a reversal of policy, any discussion of viable alternatives suggests a change in Iran’s policy.
A second, crucial instance of possible change comes in the form of Iranian efforts to lay the groundwork for long-term dialogues with Arab neighbors and a permanent seat the international diplomatic table. Moreover, Iran’s presence in the recent peace talks in Vienna exhibits confidence-building efforts. As world leaders gathered in Vienna in order to develop a plan for Syria’s future, Iran likely recognized that partaking in the talks was its only way of influencing the substantive efforts that were being taken to stabilize the conflict and securing some influence over a potential future government. Iran would ideally like to see Assad remain in power; the nation has hardly had a change in religious-political identity. But Iran’s presence in Vienna and consequent efforts by the other states present to engage the nation in substantial talks represent a strategy seemingly driven by growing pragmatism and a desire to ensure that any future Syrian government-with or without Assad-favors its strategic interests.
With each military and political shift, Iran’s strategy in Syria is looking increasingly like one multipart contingency plan that also represents a major crossroads in its foreign policy. When push comes to shove, Iran may choose to let Assad go as long as this aligns with its long-term religious-political interests in the region. Of course, contradictions undoubtedly remain in Iran’s approach, like with most of the major actors entangled in the Syrian crisis (consider President Obama’s famous “red line” on the use of chemical weapons, which was crossed without any meaningful response from the United States). In the case of Iran, this may be a result of conflicting domestic politics, specifically the contrasting priorities of the state’s two dominant political figures, President Rouhani and Ayatollah Khamenei. While the former, through both rhetoric and substantive policy, has raised hopes for an Iran that is more open to international cooperation, the later favors continued support for the Assad regime and antagonistic relations with the West.
The relationship between President Rouhani and Ayatollah Khamenei will likely remain complicated, and so will Iran’s stance on Syria. Only Iran’s actions in the coming months will give us a better insight into its long-term strategy, especially since public discourse on the war within Iran is all but nonexistent. Nonetheless, two important takeaways remain. The first is that the nature of Iran’s role in Syria is becoming increasingly crucial; it reveals insight into regional religious and or political motivations while reflecting the underestimated influence of Iran’s voice in the Middle East. The second is that although Iran’s policies on Syria are far from simple, there is evidence to suggest that their actions are moving away from an Assad-dependent strategy in favor a more long-term pursuit of stability and relationship building. If Iran chooses to pursue this route, it has the potential to dramatically alter its role in the international community and perhaps gain a level of influence that could ultimately benefit future goals.