Skip Navigation

Separatism Rises Anew in Cataluña

Four years ago, a mass demonstration in Barcelona to celebrate La Diada, Cataluña’s national holiday, triggered the latest in a long line of efforts to kick-start a serious move for Catalán independence. While a 2014 referendum in favor of independence passed resoundingly,  it was plagued by low turnout and the results were disregarded, mainly because the country’s Tribunal Constitucional already declared the exercise unconstitutional. All this could change soon, as on September 27, Carles Puigdemont, President of the Generalitat de Catalunya, announced plans to hold another referendum within a year. The pronouncement seemed timed to take advantage of the current political gridlock paralyzing Madrid — Spain has persisted without an elected government since late 2015, as two successive elections delivered parliaments without any clear majority. Emblematic of the populist turmoil affecting the whole of Spain at the moment, the political situation is providing just the platform Puigdemont needs to reinvigorate a movement that now has far more to do with economic discontent than high-minded national sovereignty.

The origins of Catalan separatism stem from the historical composition of the Kingdom of Spain. Until union of crowns with the marriage of King Fernando of Aragón and Queen Isabela of Castilla, the Iberian Peninsula was divided among many different kingdoms. Even after this union, the administrative structures of the various kingdoms that composed the Spanish crown remained completely separate; it wasn’t until the War of Spanish Succession that the separate spheres were unified. Cataluña, along with the rest of Aragón, was on the losing side of the conflict; indeed, the Catalan national day memorializes the region’s defeat in the Siege of Barcelona. Successive governments embarked on programs of centralization, although sectors of Catalan society continued to agitate for more privileges.

The darkest chapter in the movement came with the repression of the Franco regime, which outlawed the use of regional languages and brutally crushed any attempts at decentralization. The situation was relaxed with the transition to democracy; the Constitution of 1978 specifically recognizes the so-called historic “nationalities” — Galicia, Cataluña, and the País Vasco — and provides for decentralized government in the form of the autonomous communities. It seemed that, at least for the foreseeable future, the question of nationalism was settled.

The spark for the latest round of separatist agitation was the 2006 Estatuto de Autonomía, which is basically the Spanish equivalent of a state constitution. The law, negotiated between the Generalitat and Madrid, and approved in a popular referendum, was later significantly altered by the Tribunal Constitucional in 2010, angering nationalists who though the new arrangement didn’t grant the region sufficient self-governance. Support for independence began to rise in the wake of the ruling, and separatists organized demonstrations and votes across Cataluña.

The rejection of the Estatuto de Autonomiá may similarly raise the specter of an overreaching central government, but the new movement for separation doesn’t draw from the same historical roots as its predecessors — this one is driven by more practical implications. In absolute terms, Cataluña is Spain’s wealthiest region, and per capita it is in the top five. That said, Catalonians pay more in taxes to the central government than they receive in return — data from 2011 suggest that the discrepancy amounted to 8.5 billion euros. Catalan leaders have lobbied Madrid for a better deal time and time again without any luck — the center-right Partido Popular, along with many of the other autonomous communities, strongly oppose the further devolution of power to Cataluña. The economic crisis has only exacerbated the tensions, as the region is the most indebted in the country. In many ways, the continued push for independence is merely a bargaining chip in these negotiations.

The complaints of the Catalonians, while grounded in reality, ignore the inconvenient truth about secession: if the region somehow achieved independence, it’s likely that it would be far worse off. Just as was the case with Scotland, European Union membership would not automatically accrue to a newly independent Cataluña, a fact that leaders of the separatist movement often ignore. A fragmented and therefore economically weak Spain would threaten the EU, so it’s unlikely Brussels would ever strike a more accommodating stance towards the separatists. The economic turmoil that would result from independence is fairly obvious as well — Cataluña would most likely find itself a relatively small country on the periphery of Europe, without free access to the common market or even the rest of Spain.

This debate is, at this point, entirely theoretical. The Spanish government has unequivocally declared any attempt at independence to be unconstitutional; unilateral secession would be illegal, just like in the United States. Catalonians will likely continue to celebrate La Diada with protests, as they have in the four years since the movement commenced, but their grievances will fall on deaf and unwilling ears. Rather than forcing the issue and facing a future as outcasts in Brussels, Catalonian leaders would be wiser to keep their fight alive in Madrid.

Photo

About the Author

Pieter Brower '18 is a Public Policy and Hispanic Studies concentrator. He currently serves as a Managing Editor and BPR, and was formerly the Associate Content Director.

SUGGESTED ARTICLES