The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which largely consists of Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), have recently taken over the Islamic State stronghold in Raqqa, Syria. This comes with the help of a US air campaign as well as significant logistical and arms support. After a long battle that ensued for over four months, ISIS has finally been driven out of Syria. The fall of Raqqa is a significant development in the Syrian Civil War, since Raqqa was ISIS’s largest stronghold and capital city in the country. Its fall will have critical local, regional and international implications that will result in a new balance of power and spheres of influence for the battling forces. Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser on international affairs to the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, has recently suggested that the Syrian regime will soon advance to capture Raqqa from the SDF, accusing the group of threatening the territorial integrity of Syria. The eradication of ISIS from Syria is increasing the potential for confrontation between the regime forces, supported by Russia and Iran, and the US-backed SDF, thus augmenting the risk of direct confrontation between Russia, Iran and the U.S.
The US strategy in Syria has thus far been rooted in the short-term objective of fighting ISIS through their support of the Kurds. Both the Obama and Trump administrations have avoided any long-term or contingency discussion of what comes after this objective is met. However, the Trump administration is facing increasing pressure to develop an approach that looks further into the future, given the crossroads faced in the Syrian Civil War. For example, Senator John McCain has recently warned about the lack of a post-ISIS plan for Syria specifically and the Middle East in general. “What we need instead is a comprehensive strategy that takes all regional factors into account — a clear articulation of our interests and the ways and means we intend to secure them,” McCain said. “The absence of such a strategy is acutely felt even as we celebrate this important success”. National security adviser H.R. McMaster has declared that the key objective of any American strategy in Syria must be to prevent Iran from expanding and consolidating its influence in the region once ISIS is driven out, a concern that many US allies such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan share.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has recently stated that the fall of Raqqa “marks the beginning of a new phase in the Syrian conflict”, hinting that, albeit late, the administration might be in the process of developing a long-term policy for the country. Tillerson has further stated that “The United States wants a whole and unified Syria with no role for Bashar al-Assad in the government”, a position that is diametrically opposite those held by the governments of Iran and Russia. This marks a significant shift in the Trump administration’s policy regarding Syria as previous assessments thought that it “not a prerequisite that Assad goes” in order to facilitate a transitional process in Syria.
On the other hand, Syrian regime forces have made significant progress in the Deir Ez-Zor region, south of Raqqa, as well as the Abu Kamal border crossing with Iraq. Due to these recent advances from both the regime and the SDF, they now share a front that stretches along the Euphrates river. When asked about regaining control over all of the Syrian territory in early 2016, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad said, “This is a goal we are seeking to achieve without any hesitation”.
The regime’s determination to achieve complete control over all of the Syrian territory, coupled with the US’s desire to remove Assad from power, puts the conflict at a great risk of escalation. However, the U.S. has had an inactive role during most of the war thus far, and any decision to escalate the level of involvement is a risky political move domestically, especially considering Trump’s “America First” ethos. Nevertheless, Trump’ rhetoric against Iran has mounted recently, as the President threatened to revoke the Iran deal. This action could be read as a sign of the potential escalation of military action against Iran and its allies in Syria to prevent their domination over the region, especially given the concerns regarding Iran’s strong presence in Iraq and Lebanon. Furthermore, US allies in the region have a strong interest in pitting the US against Iran. Saudi Arabia and many other Gulf States, as well as Israel, see great benefit in diminishing Iran’s power in the region and might see escalation as the best way to harness American influence in order to prevent or mitigate an Iranian resurgence. While Iran might seem to be at a disadvantage in any future conflict with the US, strong allies such as Russia and China have an interest in maintaining a stable regime in Iran as well as extending Iranian influence in the region. The potential of a confrontation with Russia may lead the US to adopt a more diplomatic approach, especially given that the chances of direct confrontation with China in the Korean Peninsula have risen dramatically in the past few months. The US is no position, internationally or domestically, to start a major global conflict.
The US also needs to prevent any potential for the rebirth of ISIS in Syria, a territory clearly vulnerable to the formation of terrorist groups. With the success in defeating ISIS comes the responsibility of holding that territory and ensuring its stability. That certainly does not mean a full-scale US occupation of previously ISIS-held territory. Instead, one potential solution would be the formation of a specific sphere of influence that is under the control of a power allied to the United States. In this scenario, the natural candidate seems to be the Kurdish YPG, although this would upset many regional players including Iraq, Iran and other US allies such as Turkey. Handing power to the Kurdish YPG risks important US alliances in the region, especially with Turkey, a NATO ally. The Turkish minister of defence has previously marked that “the disruption of Syria and Iraq’s territorial integrity will ignite a bigger, global conflict with an unseen end”. This increases the pressure on the US to accept Assad’s control over Syria, as there seems to be no other candidate that does not pose a serious risk upon US relations in the region.
There is a question here that only time will be able to answer: will the US continue to back the Kurds, despite regional opposition, to ensure the stability of northeast Syria, or will it accept Assad regaining control over that region to achieve the same aim? This will also depend on what the Trump administration deems to be more important: preventing the expansion of Iranian power and influence in the region, or ensuring the security and stability of the region, and preserving stable US relations with regional powers in the Middle East.