Since the beginning of the ongoing North Korea crisis, Donald Trump’s rhetoric has only caused tensions to rise. However, promises of “fire and fury” seem to be more than just inflammatory threats: Trump’s hyperbolic language is actually based on real strategies the White House is considering to address the North Korean nuclear question. National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster has been advocating for the so-called “bloody nose” strategy, which involves the use preventive force against North Korea, and seems to have been successful in persuading the president of its merit. In fact, the White House recently rescinded Victor Cha’s nomination for the US ambassadorship to South Korea in light of his refusal to support this policy. Indeed, Cha had stated that “giving North Korea a “bloody nose” carries a huge risk to Americans.” Such action is not only dangerous for Americans, but rather to all countries involved in the current North Korea crisis and could potentially start the bloodiest conflict since World War II.
McMaster previously noted that he believes Kim Jong-un is acquiring nuclear weapons in order to achieve the goal of reunifying the Korean Peninsula under his rule. If North Korea’s nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles can reach American soil, the US will be deterred from intervening in the peninsula, allowing North Korea to escalate military actions against South Korea. If the US is to prevent such scenario, the “bloody nose” strategy explains, it must initiate a preemptive strike against Pyongyang that need not eliminate its nuclear capabilities, but sends a signal that the U.S. is committed to the security of its East Asian allies.
Underlying this strategy is a shallow understanding of deterrence as a military tactic. Deterrence has shaped American foreign policy for decades, especially during the Cold War. With the development of nuclear weapons, it became of utmost importance to avoid war with the Soviet Union. According to the logic of deterrence, an adversary can be deterred from an action if it sees that the enemy can inflict unacceptable damage greater than any of its own possible gains. Deterrence functions through proving ability and credibility to achieve one end, and avoiding confrontation, especially between nuclear powers. Successful deterrence requires capability, credibility, and communication. There is no question that the U.S. is capable of inflicting insufferable damage on North Korea, or any country in the world for that matter. President Trump’s rhetoric full of promises of “fire and fury” also proves his willingness to inflict such damage, through a nuclear strike or conventional weapons. Therefore, the key condition at stake here is successful communication or clear signaling.
The argument behind the “bloody nose” strategy is that a limited strike would prove the US’ ability and willingness to use force and thus boost its credibility for successful deterrence. However, one must take into account all possible interpretations of such actions by the Kim regime. Indeed, there is a high chance that Kim would perceive the US strike as a threat to his power, which is the thing he fears the most. Now that North Korea has acquired nuclear weapons, it is risky for the US to initiate a first preemptive attack. It makes little to no sense to assume that this “limited” strike would remain so. Any strike can be considered an existential threat to the Kim regime, especially if McMaster’s belief that the North Korean leader is irrational is in fact true. There is a concept in nuclear politics that is usually referred to as “use it or lose it.” As soon as the US threatens North Korea to lose its weapons, they will have the incentive to actually use them. North Korea’s response will not be according to what McMaster and Trump predict, but according to how the North Korean regime perceives the strike once it takes place. If Kim decides to respond, the result would be the most catastrophic American war since World War II.
Even if Kim Jong-un’s ultimate plan is reunification, it is hard to see how it could possibly be achieved. The U.S. has a strong military presence in South Korea and Japan, which has successfully deterred major North Korean aggression for as long as the conflict has existed. It is also impossible to be certain that reunification is the aim, especially given that, throughout the latter part of the 20th century, North Korea witnessed the U.S. government orchestrating coups left and right—from the ousting of Mohammad Mosaddegh’s government in Iran to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in the Iraq invasion. The only way the Kim regime can effectively deter the US and ensure its survival is through the development of nuclear weapons.
Nonetheless, it is also worth considering what the current approach of the Trump administration brings to the table. Different administration officials have had contrasting views on how to handle the situation. While McMaster has been advocating for a strong military stance, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defence James Mattis have warned constraint and proposed diplomatic solutions. While President Trump has opted for aggressive rhetoric, it is still unclear whether he leans towards a military or a diplomatic solution. The ambiguity in his stance conveys to the North Korean leadership that the way in which the US chooses to approach the crisis still depends on the actions Kim Jong-un chooses to undertake.
Whether the Trump administration is undertaking such intricate strategy or not is debatable. It is even harder to say whether they can be successful at it. Even if their efforts are fruitful, they will not solve the problem and ultimately only delay it further. The North Korean question remains unanswered, but this would give more time to resolve the underlying conflict. Regardless of the approach the administration chooses to take, tensions have reached a very dangerous level. A “bloody nose” option is certainly riskier than the tensions can handle at the present moment without escalating to a full-on war. At this point, one can only hope that President Trump understands the risks involved in such a scenario, and that, unless provoked, the U.S. would not initiate military action against North Korea.