Between 2019 and 2020, the Chinese research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 06 (向阳红 06) conducted oceanographic research missions over 10,000 kilometers of the Indian Ocean, purportedly engaging in collaboration with scientists from Sri Lanka and Myanmar to collect data on microorganisms and hydrography in the region. While the Xiang Yang Hong 06 is officially part of China’s civilian research fleet and owned by the Ministry of Natural Resources, research by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) strongly suggests that the data harvested on its mission is being used to expand China’s maritime surveillance of the region, illustrating a broader trend of blurred lines between China’s scientific and military sectors.
These blurred lines have been institutionalized in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategy of military-civil fusion (MCF, 军民融合), combining military, scientific, and economic development agendas to “strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments of national power.” As China pursues the status of a military superpower, it aims to build a navy capable of protecting its national economic and security interests in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. However, its quest for maritime dominance puts it at odds with other powers in the region. China’s strategy of MCF gives it a strategic advantage in the competition for maritime influence by allowing it to blend military objectives with scientific and commercial ones in a way that creates a unique method of naval power projection. From dual-use technology to dual-use foreign ports, China uses the supposed civilian purpose of its activities to obscure its more controversial military projects.
MCF was first introduced in 2007 at the CCP’s 17th Party Congress, and was officially incorporated into Chinese military strategy under Xi Jinping in 2015 as part of a larger political effort towards realizing the “Chinese Dream” and becoming a “great modern socialist country.” Two key components of the MCF strategy are the integration of the defense industrial and civilian scientific bases and the coordination of commercial and military infrastructure.
China has utilized dual-use technologies to further its maritime ambitions. The Xiang Yang Hong 06 exemplifies the value China gains from this dual-use capability. The Chinese vessel is equipped with undersea gliders, autonomous underwater vehicles that use sensors to collect comprehensive oceanographic data for the purpose of creating water column profiles. While this data contributes to scientific endeavors, such as studying microorganisms in Sri Lanka and coral reefs in Myanmar, it also increases the PLA Navy’s understanding of the maritime environment—a critical part of enabling the expansion of Chinese naval operations.
The ability to confidently operate in oceans abroad is dependent upon knowledge of ocean conditions and accurate oceanographic models, which inform operations like navigation, undersea warfighting, safe submarine operations, anti-submarine warfare, amphibious landings, and more. When research expeditions like that of the Xiang Yang Hong 06 collect data about the western Pacific Ocean, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean under the pretense of scientific advancement and send it to the PLA Navy through the strong integration of China’s scientific and military sectors, China’s naval capabilities are enhanced and the PLA becomes more confident it can project its power in regions it could not before.
While many countries use oceanographic data to support defense capabilities, China’s lack of transparency is unique. More importantly, this lack of transparency gives the PRC a strategic advantage over its maritime competitors in the region. Compared to a country like India, which is hoping to increase its maritime capabilities but largely adheres to the international maritime order, China can gain more strategic information through its opaque operations and divergence from maritime norms. Chinese dual-use surveillance operations allow it to gain intelligence and increase its capabilities without provoking overt military retaliation, operating in a perpetual gray zone that minimizes the chance for significant retaliation.
Though dual-use technologies are an important part of China’s maritime strategy, the military-technology connection is just one part of the dots that MCF hopes to connect. China has also begun to fuse its military and commercial sectors in an attempt to strengthen its naval power, particularly by building commercial port infrastructure abroad that fits military requirements. These ports are effectively dual-use facilities—owned by Chinese corporations, and usable by the PLA Navy.
Since 2000, a hundred African commercial ports have been constructed by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). One of these ports, located in the Equatorial Guinean city of Bata, illustrates what dual-use can look like. The Bata port was built by the state-owned China Communications Construction Company in 2014. As part of the MCF domain resource sharing principle, Chinese construction standards require civilian port infrastructure to be built to military standards. As a SOE, the China Communications Construction Company is bound by China’s national security law to allow PLA access to the port. While these ports being built by Chinese firms seem like a commercial investment at face value, the MCF principle of dual-use presents a much blurrier image.
PLA Navy ships have already utilized one-third of Chinese commercial ports constructed abroad. During peacetime, access to these ports and critical infrastructure around the world allows China to maintain the security of the trade networks that its economy relies on and generally expand its foreign presence. Bata, for instance, is a strategic foothold on the Atlantic Ocean and an opportunity for Chinese naval presence in the region. A significant PLA presence there allows China to directly protect its Atlantic shipping routes.
China’s strategic competitors worry more about the wartime uses of a dual-use international port network. During a conflict with a foreign adversary, China’s global trade network could be seriously disrupted. Being able to control naval shipping routes and counter any potential interference is therefore an immense advantage to the PRC. Dual-use commercial ports fill the holes of trade network vulnerability during conflict.
By blurring the lines between commercial and security initiatives, China utilizes its economic superpower status to appeal to potential host countries as a trading partner. While host countries do not have to allow PLA ships to utilize ports, a desire to maintain a close economic relationship with China erodes a host country’s “strategic autonomy” and allows China to extract security gains at a lower financial and political cost than building an entire network of naval bases. As China’s capabilities have strengthened and the economic benefits it can offer have grown, it has become more attractive for some states as a direct security partner. For others, economic gains from a stronger trade relationship are worth the enhanced leverage they give to China.
For example, China is accused of trying to build a military site at its port in the United Arab Emirates without the knowledge of the Emirati government. Gray-zone tactics such as these are not a textbook case of MCF, but still reveal how the PRC pushes the boundaries of its trade partners in ways that cross the line between economic and military demands.
MCF is uniquely Chinese in character. While Chinese ambitions are often discussed in the context of US-China strategic competition, the PLA Navy does not seek to replace the US Navy as “the dominant global security provider.” It does not have the capacity to adopt the American posture of forward deployment and is not planning to engage in significant conflict outside of its near waters. Chinese naval officials have pointed out that their ambitions preclude being a “global maritime hegemon.” To achieve its more limited goals compared to the US, China does not need the expansive legacy network of US naval bases abroad.
Military-civil fusion is about accomplishing these objectives efficiently and optimizing all resources available, even if it operates within the gray zone of the international order. Blurring the lines between economic and military priorities has created a clearer and more distinct strategic identity within the PRC. As it grows its naval influence and capabilities, China will find itself a maritime power with unique strategic capabilities.