The Bind of the Brotherhood

It is no secret that revolution, successful or otherwise, rarely produces results as glorious as initially imagined. For example, the world has seen its expectations dashed time and time again in the so-called “Arab Spring” countries, which are instead increasingly (and tediously) associated with the phrase “Arab Winter.” Take Egypt, one of the first Arab nations to revolt against its long-standing, corrupt regime. The Egyptian elections last year went in favor of the controversial but well-established Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist political party, due to the revolutionaries’ failure to organize a viable opposing party. And ever since, President Morsi’s regime has seen only mounting political instability (which in recent months has even led to a wave of violent street protests) because the Brotherhood is not viewed as the rightful heir to post-revolutionary Egypt. To top it all off, Egypt is currently experiencing dangerous structural economic problems that threaten to disenfranchise the entire population if new programs are not introduced soon.

But soft! what economic aid through yonder international organization comes? It is the prospect of an enormous loan, and the International Monetary Fund is the sun the one bailing Egypt out. For the past several months, Morsi’s administration has been considering a multi-billion dollar aid package from the IMF. This loan is intended to increase foreign direct investment (which has suffered immensely since the fall of the Mubarak regime) and facilitate job creation. In general, it would provide a quick fix to the economic problems the Egyptian people are facing.

The catch? In order for a country to receive a loan from the IMF, “a policy program supported by financing is designed by the national authorities in close cooperation with the IMF.” In other words, the Egyptian government is required to institute political reforms that would help them best utilize the loan and prevent similar economic problems from occurring again. So – not a big deal, right? After all, the IMF isn’t asking for much – only tax increases, subsidy decreases, and above all proof of broad-based political support for these reforms “to ensure that the government will honor its commitments in the future.” This degree of support would require a spectrum-wide political consensus that has eluded Egypt since its revolution – but the promised loans are so immense that international policymakers are certain the Egyptians will find it in themselves to work together and receive the funds. Even recently-confirmed US Secretary of State John Kerry promised $250 million in aid if Egypt brokers the deal with the IMF. Kerry and the IMF are certain that the enormity of the proffered aid will bring the Egyptian factions together – and with Morsi’s recent pledge to go ahead with the IMF’s stipulations, everything seems to be falling into place.

However, not only is it questionable whether the broad political consensus demanded by the IMF can even be reached, but even if the economic aid is given it will be insufficient to alleviate the political instability that has plagued the country since 2011. For despite the strings attached to the aid packages from the United States and the IMF, there is no way the current government will be able to meet the needs of the Egyptian people in the long run. According to IMF Middle East and Central Asia Department Division Chief Andreas Bauer, “Broad-based domestic and international support will be crucial for the successful implementation of the planned policies.” The international support, as evidenced by the pledges from the US and Saudi Arabia, among others, is already there. However, the domestic support (in terms of a political coalition that actually represents the will of the people) is not in the cards anytime soon.

Essentially, the Egyptian government under the Muslim Brotherhood is currently experiencing a two-pronged crisis of political legitimacy and the economic problems discussed above, and the two are inextricably linked. The Brotherhood came to power last year principally because there was no other viable option. The people were reluctant to trust a figure from Mubarak’s regime (which had been rife with corruption) and the leaders of the revolution formed several competing camps instead of banding together to spearhead the post-Mubarak political effort. Highly bureaucratized and with an extensive patronage network, the Brotherhood was able to gain control of the fragmented society, but has now proven to be incompetent, inefficient and out of touch with the populace.

The only way Morsi’s administration will be able to address even the immediate demands of the people is if they ally themselves with either the old regime or the revolutionary forces. A partnership with the former would increase Morsi’s efficiency in dealing with the population, as the old regime went hand in hand with the Egyptian security forces, and state policing might become as strict as in past decades. However, reaching out to the revolutionaries might provide Morsi with more political legitimacy, as the opposition forces are seen as deserving to take the reins of the country post-revolution.

On the other hand, both options have their drawbacks. Aligning themselves with the revolutionary leaders would compromise the Brotherhood ideologically (as they are Islamist and the revolutionaries secular), and would even further alienate the radical Salafist faction. And dealing with officials of the previous regime would cost Morsi materially because Mubarak’s old patronage network would expect to regain all the control and eminence it possessed under the last administration.

So to put it mildly, the Brotherhood finds itself in a bind. Going into the parliamentary elections next month, it will be interesting to see whether the IMF loan affects the Brotherhood’s electoral success – and indeed, if the revolutionary parties can even get it together to participate at all.

But even after all that, the important thing to take away from this political stalemate is not that the Brotherhood is facing a difficult decision over which coalition to form, but that neither option will work in the long term. Even if a clear political solution is reached and a coalition is formed that is able to work effectively with military and security apparatus, something in Egyptian society has broken. With the revolution and the two years of dissatisfaction since, there has risen an undercurrent (albeit a powerful one) of empowerment within the Egyptian psyche. The same methods, perpetrated by the same actors only shuffled around a little, will not do in the years ahead – and no amount of  international aid will be able to do anything more than fix immediate economic problems. Depending on the route the Muslim Brotherhood decides to take, Egyptian politics will develop differently in the years ahead. But looking further down the road, an entirely different configuration (possibly an alliance of revolutionary parties) will be necessary to address the long term needs of the Egyptian people – and Kerry and the others throwing money at Morsi would do well to realize it.