It has been over three years since the euphoria of Egypt’s Arab Spring. Hosni Mubarak’s rapid deposition and the groundswell of popular activism throughout the country promised a new age of democracy and peace in Egypt. Unfortunately, this did not turn out to be the case. The dictator’s ousting was followed by the highly contested election of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical Islamist group, to the majority of parliamentary seats and the presidency. The Brotherhood’s regime was then overthrown by a military coup d’état, during which its supporters were openly attacked on the streets. Egyptians are still protesting, and their manifestations are still being suppressed. It would seem that the situation is as unstable as when Mubarak first left office. Is this the fate we can expect for the other countries involved in the Arab Spring, such as Syria and Libya?
With the 2012 Benghazi terrorist attack in Libya and the prolonged civil war in Syria, the situation doesn’t look promising. In Syria, a negative outcome seems especially likely due to the dichotomy of secular and theocratic parties, which will likely split the country once the conflict ends. If one looks at revolutions throughout history there is a noticeable divide: those that weren’t followed by internal violence and those that were. The United States, India and Vietnam are examples of the former. The latter includes France, Mexico, Russia and Iran. The difference between these groups is in whom they were revolting against. Insurrections against foreign powers are more likely to lead to stability, and those that behead the internal power structure are more likely to lead to post-revolutionary civil strife.
The French Revolution is a paradigmatic case of instability arising from the deposition of domestic monarchs. The conflict was fundamentally a response to decades of mismanagement and neglect. The lower class literally starved, and the educated middle class had no means to advance in a tightly controlled aristocracy. This created a restless proletariat whose survival depended on massive change, an ambitious middle class hungry for self-advancement and landed nobles seeking to maintain their comfortable station. Such conflict between portions of the same population is characteristic of internally-focused uprisings.
On the other hand, revolutions against foreign powers, such as the American Revolution, usually have the upper class leading the oppressed lower classes into conflict. This is a phenomenon often seen in nationalistic movements, where an ethnic or cultural group moves united against foreign controllers regardless of class. In this way, the nation is brought together to rally against a common enemy. Post-revolution, this serves as the foundation for an inclusive government involving all parties.
The availability of experienced upper class individuals in a revolution against external powers serves as a valuable foundation for leadership and effective governance after the end of hostilities. The ones who managed to become domestic leaders while under the rule of the foreign power are able to naturally rise to the leadership positions of the country. This is easily observed in the United States, as the Founding Fathers, most of whom were wealthy landowners, ruled the nation after the British were overthrown. This left the United States with a group of relatively undisputed, experienced and rational men in charge.
In contrast, when a country overthrows a domestic ruler, different factions within the state attempt to fill the power vacuum, making it difficult to form a cohesive government. Bitter partisanship in the wake of the French Revolution and the beheading of monarchical power structures gave rise to the Great Terror. Influential parties and individuals, such as Robespierre, rose to power on a tide of their own countrymen’s blood, continuing the revolution’s violence long after the old tyrants had been deposed.
This dangerous mentality discourages discourse and compromise while encouraging extremist groups, who are more capable of staying together in turbulent political climates than moderate groups. All post-revolutionary nations have to deal with pressure from outside states; they are more vulnerable due to post-war fatigue and unstable political systems. In nations that threw out foreign rulers, fear of being re-conquered compels them to compromise in domestic matters, since a political impasse could lead to weakening the state, which would allow foreign powers to regain control. This fear is less acute in nations coming out of entirely domestic revolts, such as Russia, where the Bolsheviks dissolved the democratic national parliament and carried out their coup. As a result, these nations are more likely to fall prey to civil strife, since not only do they have less impetus to compromise, but their inhabitants also view revolt as a valid mode of political expression — even to contest their own, domestic government. Thus, they are more likely to overthrow post-revolutionary regimes at the cost of their own security against foreign invaders.
This is why we see Egypt, Syria and Libya continuing to undergo civil strife: individuals have seen that the most effective way to deal with new governments which cannot be immediately changed is to overthrow them. This is why France is currently in its Fifth Republic. Powerful examples include the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Bolsheviks in Russia, who physically imposed their ideology on the rest of the citizenry after they took power, causing further deaths and oppression. Strongman politics often prevail under these circumstances, and powerful military leaders, like General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in
Egypt, seize control through sheer might. This has been witnessed countless times from Napoleon in France to Adly Mansour, the military’s chosen civilian president in Egypt.
In Egypt we saw multiple groups vying for power and the most radical succeeded. Following this, dissenting parties continued to protest aggressively, and we saw parties consolidating any power they could get instead of compromising, ultimately ending in the military coup d’état. These issues are also likely to plague states such as Syria and Libya, whose fates are now more volatile than ever. An optimist could argue that removal of an oppressive regime, and the subsequent risk of instability, is preferable to wallowing under a dictator. Oppressive, post-revolutionary governments throughout history, however, indicate otherwise.