January 3rd, 2026 marked a turning point in the legitimacy of state sovereignty when President Donald Trump’s administration seized Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Following this capture, Trump declared his intention to “run the country” until a deliberate transfer of power filled the resulting vacuum. Although Venezuelans celebrated the end of a decade-long dictatorship, their hopes were tempered by apprehension over the country’s uncertain political future.
In the aftermath of this regime upheaval, one of Venezuela’s key allies took notably little action. Since Venezuela shifted toward a left-leaning government aiming to shed American influence following the 1982 Bolivarian Revolution, Russia became one of its closest allies. Under President Vladimir Putin, such ties only strengthened, with Russia dispatching strategic bombers, helping transport military supplies, and exporting approximately $14.5 billion in arms aid to its Latin American ally. Venezuela has long been thought of as a lynchpin in Russia’s mission to counteract American influence in the Western Hemisphere.
While the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs verbally condemned the kidnapping of Maduro in official statements, calling it a “breach of all norms of international law” and urging the United States to release Maduro and his wife immediately, the Kremlin has taken no material action to restore Maduro’s seat in power.
Despite their verbal condemnation of United States actions, the Kremlin actually has ample reason to support such behavior, as it is in line with Russia’s own breaches of the “rules-based order.” Moreover, physically intervening in Venezuela would be damaging to Russia’s most pressing geopolitical concern: negotiating with Trump to secure a favorable peace deal in Ukraine.
The action taken by the Trump administration sets an alarming precedent that jeopardizes the legitimacy of the international “rules-based order.” This system, often referred to as the “liberal international order,” is characterized by liberal democratic values aimed at promoting multilateral cooperation through the stress of rules, laws, and norms. A quintessential aspect of this normative system is the preservation and respect of territorial status quos–that is, state sovereignty and international respect of borders. Russia, however, is no stranger to breaching this international “rules-based order.” Its 2022 invasion of Ukraine was a blatant violation of the sovereignty that Ukraine had held in the status quo. To Russia, undoubtedly, the international order holds little significance.
Thus, Russia’s condemnation of the United States actions was little more than a performative grievance. Their gesture was forced because the action involved a takedown of a close ally, but in actuality, any violation of the “rules-based order” is to the benefit of the Kremlin. When the United States intervenes on the world stage, it sets a precedent for other countries to follow suit. It normalizes the regime-toppling that is essential to Putin’s revisionist worldview. In other words, the international community becoming desensitized to regime overthrows, such as the Venezuelan example, is essential to helping Putin achieve his mission of recreating the former Russian empire.
Another reason for Russia’s lack of action regarding Venezuela lies in Russia’s conventional weakness and its lack of success in Ukraine. Unwilling to surrender Ukraine, Putin has exhausted his conventional military power, devastating the Russian economy in his guns over butter trade-off, or the phenomenon that increasing one’s military budget decreases spending on domestic programs. Despite Russia’s interest in safeguarding Maduro’s regime for geopolitical reasons, it was not feasible for Moscow to intervene due to its resource scarcity driven by the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Even prior to their current engagement in Ukraine, Russian intervention has historically not been successful. Ten years following Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015, Putin withdrew troops after the failed intervention exacerbated the conflict and strained any hopes for a resolution. Simply, Russia must be cautious to engage in foreign ventures—what the Kremlin needs at this point is for the war in Ukraine to end, which further antagonization of the Trump administration would prevent.
Despite commentary about Putin’s unwillingness to give up Ukraine, trapping himself into a war that he has no choice but to continue fighting in, Putin is hopeful that the Trump administration will support a peace deal in Ukraine that favors Russia. Similar to the logic of Russia’s “all bark no bite” approach to Trump’s actions in Venezuela, Putin is grandstanding his refusal to give up fighting in its war with Ukraine.
The peace negotiations for Ukraine remain ongoing, but were asked to be postponed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Leaks of the 28-point plan in November 2025 brokered by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, which proposes that Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk be recognized as de facto Russian and requires Ukraine to withdraw from areas of the Donbas it still controls. Under the new plan, an immediate ceasefire is demanded. The plan outlines its provisions favorable for Ukraine slightly more vaguely than it does for its Russian counterpart. Favorable outcomes for Ukraine highlighted in the plan are a “reconfirmation” of Ukrainian sovereignty, eligibility to join the EU, a receival of robust Security Guarantees, and rebuilding efforts for the nation. On Russia’s side, the peace plan prohibits NATO membership and caps the size of Ukraine’s military to 600,000 in peacetime. Most impactfully, after facing a devastating economic blow from its war with Ukraine, Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy. This provision lifts Russia out of the painful sanctions, grants them recognition from the G8, and outlines a long-term cooperation agreement with the United States for mutual development in energy, natural resources, AI, and infrastructure. Reconnecting with the global economies and being invited to rejoin the G8 would mean Russia would regain recognition as a major power integrated within the international community. Both countries, as well as NATO, must agree to a comprehensive non-agreement agreement. Russia is expected not to invade neighboring countries. The plan significantly limits NATO expansion, prohibiting them from stationing troops in Ukraine.
The 28-point proposal has created the favorable conditions Putin has longed for. The negotiating table has leaned in Russia’s favor, giving Putin the most bargaining power as Ukraine is cornered into weighing terms it simply cannot accept coupled with the looming threat of losing its most important ally. After the peace plan asked for very little of Russia in return for Ukrainian concessions, the Kremlin’s interest in a diplomatic resolution was reaffirmed. The Trump administration’s decision to suspend all direct grants and aid to Ukraine previously enacted under President Joe Biden now puts pressure on Moscow to accept a peace deal.
Putin’s inaction and choice not to complicate the United States operation in Venezuela symbolizes Moscow’s unwillingness to strain its relations with President Trump, and Venezuela is far from the only example. As American intervention in Iran unfolds, Russia’s inaction on that front gestures toward a similar unwillingness to intervene in destruction of the international “rules-based order.” The same logic of inaction is paralleled when Russia did not intervene despite verbally condemning United States intervention in Libya and the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Evidently, breaches of the “rules-based order” are actually beneficial for Russia, even when they might geopolitically favor the United States. Namely, Putin’s entire mission to restore the former Russian empire relies on breaches of the international “rules-based order.” Thus, when liberal countries like the United States engage in similar breaches, it “desensitizes” the global stage to the exact status quo-altering action that the Kremlin is interested in engaging in. Putin is, hence, critical of the Maduro overthrow in words alone. He does not want to resist such actions because he knows that this gradual overwriting of the status quo is good for Russia’s long term mission, leaving many questions unanswered: In Putin’s mind, when will the United States cross the line? How long will Ukraine tie Russia’s hands before Putin decides to take action against America’s increasingly interventionist foreign policy?