Europe Goes Cold on Turkey

If the European Union does not want Turkey, then why should we want to be a part of the EU? Such was the refrain of the Roberts College students in Istanbul, Turkey when I visited in Turkey 2011 on an exchange program and had the opportunity to speak to students there.

A cool resentment fueled the Turkish students’ view of the Western institution, a position that has become more prominent as an even more contentious relationship between the United States and Turkey emerged during the Arab Spring. The expectation that Turkey would advance the West’s interests in the Middle East as the literal and ideological bridge between the East and the West combined with the rejection of Turkey from the EU and the Olympic Committee creates a worrisome dichotomy between the West’s rejection of and expectations of Turkey that will negatively affect the relationship if not addressed.

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the foundations for modern Turkey were laid by the man whose popular name Ataturk literally means father of the Turks. Ataturk is revered in Turkey for his Westernization of Turkey between 1921-1945. Secular democracy and the elimination of Islamic law composed the two most important changes Ataturk made to the majority Muslim country. These changes, however, also created the dichotomy that has plagued Turkey since Ataturk’s death in 1938. The secular nature of the government and the religious nature of the population has often created conflicts in Turkey,  most notably from the early 1940’s through the 1970’s during which the military toppled any government they viewed as being overly religious, and most recently during the popular protests.

Turkey’s PR problems aren’t limited to religious ones. Turkey invaded Cyprus in the summer of 1974, which not only cemented the disastrous nature of Turkish-Cypriot relations but also has had lasting effects on Turkey’s international image. Again, the military took over the government. After writing a new constitution and allowing national elections, the military gradually released control but was still highly present in government operations, specifically in the systematic suppression of the Kurds in Eastern Turkey. Economic and social oppression of fully 20% of Turkey’s population has furthered Turkey’s negative international image and contributed to social unrest within the country.

The military’s control extended until Recept Erdogan’s 2002 contentious election to Prime Minister which involved a constitutional amendment allowing him to rule. Erdogan successfully replaced military control and has moved towards a more benign and Western-friendly form of governance. Erdogan’s government has led to drastic domestic policy changes that seem to have paved the way for Turkey’s application to the European Union.

In order to become a member of the EU, each applying nation must meet the requirements of 35 chapters of UN regulations. Each chapter contains various standards of economic processes and civil rights, ranging from farming regulations to freedom of speech. As each potential EU country attempts to fulfill each chapter, they are given financial assistance from the EU. Throughout the process, countries are consistently reviewed by the EU governing body. In order for a chapter to be considered completed, every member nation must vote concurrently.

Turkey began its attempt to become a member of the European Union in 1987 and the European Union agreed to begin reviewing Turkey in 2005.  This process has been stalled, stopped, and restarted by various European states and institutions, with most of the hesitancy focusing on the central issue that Turkey is not European enough.

In order to have the European Union regard Turkey’s application as legitimate, Erdogan took several key initiatives. He chose an Islamist as President, significantly decreased the military’s power domestically, and began to recognize the political and civil rights of Kurdish organizers. Those three actions cannot be underestimated since they overturned three historically and culturally defining characteristics of the nation: military rule, secular preferences, and Kurdish oppression. Those policy changes led to the beginning of formal discussions in 2005, However, Turkey’s refusal to recognize Cyprus, already an EU member, was a requirement to ascension and the annual reports from 2006-2009 state that Turkey was making only negligible process towards completing the 35 chapters. Interestingly, Turkey’s economic position as the 17th largest global economy has never been a contentious issue. Perhaps this is a mistake in the calculation of the EU, since a large portion of EU countries ought to be concerned primarily with sustaining their economic vitality and the economic vitality of the EU at large. Instead, the EU’s decision to focus on Turkey’s civil rights issues has frustratingly dominated the ascension.

Despite Turkey’s efforts to grant freedoms of expression and freedoms of religion, to ameliorate relations with the Kurds, and to increase participation in international energy and economic efforts, the EU still did not see the necessary progress towards full membership. Additionally, Turkish-Cypriot relations began to swing out of control from 2010-2012 and EU membership became less and less likely as Cyprus’s acceptance in the EU solidified. This past year has brought new life to Turkish-EU relations through the important opening of Chapter 22, “Regional Policy”, in the 35-chapter accession process. But progress also reached a new blockade with the domestic turmoil between Turkish citizens and Prime Minister Erdogan. Yet again, it seems the trend is one step forward, four steps back.

It is not only the EU, but other Western institutions have shunned Turkey as an equal. The inclination to treat Turkey as a second-class country has been repeated by the Olympic Committee’s short-list and then rejection of Istanbul as the host for the 2020 Olympics. In the past twenty years, Turkey has campaigned to host the Olympics five times. Most recently, Turkey proposed the most expensive Olympic Games at nearly 19.2 billion dollars, displaying Turkey’s economic strength, a reality long pushed aside by the EU. After being selected to be in the top five potential cities alongside Doha Baku, Madrid, and Tokyo, Istanbul was chosen to be in the top three and finally the final two. Citing Istanbul’s potential to host the Olympics on both Europe and Asia simultaneously, Erdogan appealed to the West’s projected duty to be the “bridge between the East and the West”. In what must have been an all too familiar moment, Turkey was rejected.

Where is the incentive for Turkey to keep trying? Year after year, Turkey is rejected from full acceptance in the Western world. Unless, of course, the Western World needs something only Turkey can offer, as in the case of the Arab Spring and the Syrian Conflict. Turkey has been repeatedly told that it is close enough to be considered and given hoops to jump through, but still too far away to be given full acceptance. This could all be palatable if it weren’t for the double standard imposed on Turkey by the West to step in for Western countries times of trouble with the Middle East.  During the Arab Spring and particularly the Syrian Crisis, Turkey has been expected to mediate lessen tensions.

Turkey’s advantageous geographical location between Europe and Asia has made it valuable geostrategic property since before the Ottoman Empire. As a dependable member of NATO and a secular democracy with a majority Muslim population, Turkey has been used as the mediator between Western institutions and the more radical Middle Eastern nations. Most recently, the Arab Spring cast Turkey as the communications correspondent between the United States and on-the-ground developments in Egypt and Tunisia. In fact, rhetoric reflected an expectation that Erdogan would even advance the interests and values of the United States in the Middle East, though it would have been a trade with nothing in return.

Turkey’s response to the Syrian crisis has failed to meet the expectations imposed by the United States as well. It was originally hoped that Turkey would be able to either broker a deal with or influence Bashar Al-Assad as Erdogan did with Egypt and Hosni Mubarak. But as the conflict has spiraled out of control and Turkey has declined any military involvement, Turkey’s potential role as peace mediator has disappeared. Initially at the epicenter of the conflict, Turkey has faded to the background as Russia and the United States have come to battle it out instead. The problem with Turkey’s role in the Syrian crisis has caused is not that Turkey failed to meet the United States’ expectation but that the United States imposed those expectations at all.

Turkey is the teenager in the family—not allowed to sit at the adult table at Thanksgiving, but expected to prevent the younger children from playing with matches or falling down the stairs—a tough role for anyone, but exceedingly more so for a developing nation. Being expected to fulfill an international task without being given an international role is far from sustainable. It would not be wise to push Turkey to the point of abandoning its hopes and efforts to becoming a Western nation by denying it a formal position at every opportunity.