In just a few short months this summer, the world has borne witness to a rapidly and profoundly altered status quo. In the United States, five out of the four justices of the Supreme Court, faced with public opinion across the nation increasingly in favor of legalizing same-sex marriage, declared a landmark decision affirming marriage equality as a right. In the wake of a destructive rampage carried out by a young man operating under a neo-Nazi creed in a historically black church in Charleston, SC that killed eight churchgoers, , legislators in that state voted to remove the Confederate flag that flew beside the state’s capitol building. Abroad, significant political changes are afoot as well: A massive crackdown on corruption within FIFA, world soccer’s governing body, and this week, a finalized a deal with Iran regarding its nuclear program that will hopefully serve as the first step to ending its status as a pariah state.
Perhaps that’s the reason that less attention has been given to small but noteworthy shifts in a struggle that has commanded negative headlines in recent times: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nearly one year has elapsed since the launch of Operation Protective Edge, the third incursion into the Gaza Strip in the previous six years by the Israeli military. Little ground has been given since then. Israel’s economic blockade of Gaza still remains mostly in place, Hamas still governs there, and Fatah still retains a tenuous hold on the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Moreover, Israel’s domestic political situation continues to be relatively stable. In spite of occasional threats to his political power, Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud Party won a resounding victory in the Knesset elections this year and remain the largest party in the parliament, heading a coalition that includes, along with Likud, one centrist party, two religious orthodox parties and one far-right ethno-nationalist party.
To the casual observer of this situation, which in many ways remains unchanged since Netanyahu came to power in 2009, it may be easy to ignore the fact that Israel’s standing in the global community is slowly but surely eroding and that the nation’s leaders are scrambling to form a cohesive response. Like other symbols of traditional power now rendered untenable, Israel’s policy towards the Palestinian issue is in need of substantial alterations. And while the South Carolina Legislature and the U.S. Justice Department, among others, stepped up to spearhead change, Israel is botching the job horribly. This should be cause for alarm in Washington and elsewhere.
There are a number of reasons for Israel’s unresponsiveness to changing global political conditions. Perhaps the oldest of these are the personnel that have been working on the front lines of Israeli foreign policy for the past half-decade, many of whom have consistently brought militantly conservative stances to the table and, with them, little hope for change. Immediately after forming a coalition with Likud in 2009, the Yisrael Beitenu, a right-wing nationalist party, had one of its own appointed as foreign minister: Avigdor Lieberman, a character far from diplomatic in persona. More recently, appointments of various far-right politicians to important foreign policy posts has chipped away the legitimacy of Israeli diplomacy and pushed Prime Minister Netanyahu to articulate Israel’s foreign policy himself. The results, as clearly seen in Netanyahu’s controversial speech in March to the U.S. Congress on the Iran negotiations, have not been promising. There exists little reason for the international community to engage with Netanyahu. His negative attitude towards the ultimately productive dialogue with Iran was indicative of a direct challenge against and disrespect for the sensible diplomatic efforts of President Obama’s administration, and his decisions regarding the composition of his coalition’s leadership suggest that he seeks to sabotage diplomatic efforts rather and lacks interest in rational decision making.
Beyond Israel’s leadership, the harsh realities of the nation’s conduct during the Gaza conflict one year ago have also placed it at odds with the rest of the world, even as it publicly absolves itself of guilt. Following the invasion, both sides in the conflict were blamed for war crimes. Hamas came under fire for the supposed use of human shields and for indiscriminately targeting Israeli civilians. Israel was blamed for wreaking havoc on civilian life within Gaza and destroying the region’s infrastructure, all while Gazans had little or no chance of escaping the violence. In response, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a comprehensive advertising campaign defending its actions, employing “What would you do?” tactics that referenced Hamas rocket fire on Israel and ultimately taking a defensive stance about its military strategy. Testimonies from soldiers on the ground at the time proved the IDF’s defensive claims to be largely false. And with on-the-ground reports of the situation in Gaza numerous and freely available, it has seemed easy for even a casual observer to see just what kind of a war took place. One year later, the state of affairs appears mostly unimproved, even if the headlines have disappeared. The global community has collectively raised an eyebrow at Israel’s claims of benevolence. On July 3, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution criticizing Israel for its handling of the invasion. The vote was a resounding 41 to one with five abstentions. The dissenting voice was, unsurprisingly, the United States, a longtime ally of the Jewish state. Among the majority were all three influential European members of the Council: Britain, France and, most interestingly, Germany, a nation known for standing reliably with Israel. Though Hamas was also indicted by the report that preceded the resolution, the main message of the vote was clear: Israeli actions in Gaza have not flown under the radar. Since then, Tel Aviv’s reaction has been predictable. Netanyahu stuck to his rhetorical line, insisting that Israel is “innocent of any crime.”
The nature of Israel’s response to growing criticism from the rest of the world has merely served to exude desperation on its part. Hints of shell shock have accompanied Israel’s retreat from the moral high ground that the nation occupied after the Second Intifada, as is evident in statements from its most important officials. Netanyahu’s aforementioned speech in Washington was a laughable affair, noticeably catering to the far right (and particularly the Christian sector) of the U.S. Congress, a group that believes in Israel’s divine right to exist as it does and advocates for the foolhardy move of attacking Iran. Even more regrettably, it was just the latest example of a long legacy of hawkish rhetoric directed at Iran by the Likud government. However, it seems that the West is taking Netanyahu less and less seriously, especially after the ratification of the nuclear agreement with Iran in mid-July.
In the meantime, Israel’s moves on a number of other fronts are similarly indicative of turmoil. Faced with the specter of increased international involvement bolstering the Palestinians’ desire for reparations for the damage inflicted on Gaza, Israel radically changed tacks this month by agreeing to engage with the International Criminal Court, strictly for the purposes of “[making] its position clear to the court.” Although a small gesture, it is nonetheless unprecedented. While it may seem a positive development, this reversal of policy coincides with rumors of Israeli engagement with Hamas. Given the intransigence of both parties, it is hard to imagine that these are serious talks. More likely, Israeli outreach, coupled with the olive branch extended to the ICC, represent an Israeli attempt to undermine the Palestinian Authority on two fronts. Opening proceedings with the court, as a signal of Israel’s reasonable stance, could somewhat mute loud cries for justice from Hamas. And talking with Hamas in secret would undermine the already fragile and tentative cooperation between Hamas and Fatah, perhaps escalating tensions reminiscent of 2007, when armed conflict broke out between the two groups. A fractured Palestinian resistance would give Israel both legitimacy and leverage, two assets recently in short supply for the nation.
Resorting to this sort of realpolitik is not likely to work out well in the long run. Israel’s aggressively Machiavellian approach to the Palestinian issue, both in its choice of representative personnel and policy, has only contributed to its current dilemma. Instead of using its position since the Gaza conflict last summer as a reason to harden its belligerent, military-centric attitude, Israel should remain flexible in the face of a changing global geopolitical landscape. It ought to take steps to bolster a prospective unity government between Hamas and Fatah; when the two sides are prodded to cooperate, the chances of a forced moderation of Hamas become much stronger and its grip on Gaza weaker as its citizens no longer see Hamas as a guarantor of well-being. Hamas is an obstacle to peace, and with the group marginalized, it becomes easier for Israel to negotiate with the Palestinian Authority on the core issues that are preventing any two-state solution. This would far from assure an end to the conflict, but it would be an excellent start.