On October 1, the Parliament of Catalonia defied Spain’s federal government by holding a referendum on Catalan independence. Catalonia, an autonomous community within Spain, has long been ambivalent towards Spanish rule, and has historically attempted secession multiple times since it is culturally distinct from Spain, with its own language, traditions, and flourishing economy. The Catalan Parliament claims that the results of the vote supported independence by a margin of 90% to 10%; however, the veracity of these claims and the legitimacy of the referendum are in doubt due to disruptions by the federal police, riots, irregular voter registration, a lack of independent confirmation, and low turnout caused by the Spanish government’s suggestion that those opposed to secession stay home to avoid possibly violent encounters. Although Spain’s government deemed the vote invalid, the Catalan separatist movement, headed by Carles Puigdemont, considers it a legitimate mandate for independence.
Since the referendum, the Spanish and Catalan governments have been engaged in standoffs. Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy gave Puigdemont until October 16th to clarify whether he was formally declaring independence, while simultaneously threatening Catalonia by initiating the process to invoke Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution–a provision that gives the federal government the power to impose direct rule over the region in the case of a constitutional crisis. Puigdemont responded by sending Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy a letter asking to enter internationally mediated dialogue but remained ambiguous as to whether or not he was formally declaring independence. On October 19, the Spanish government declared it would take emergency measures “to defend the general interest of Spaniards, among them the citizens of Catalonia.”
Catalan independence has quickly become a messy, controversial issue. The federal government had already faced a host of criticism for disabling parts of the internet, confiscating ballots, and threatening and detaining separatist officials prior to the referendum; violent clashes and the use of truncheons and rubber bullets on the day of the election did nothing to improve their standing in Catalonia. Following the detainment of two prominent Catalan politicians, comparisons have been drawn between Spain’s current government and that of the Franco era–a not-too-distant memory for many Catalans. As tensions between the federal government and Catalonia’s parliament escalate, it is becoming increasingly clear that a true Catalan declaration of independence would be disastrous for both Spain and Catalonia. Rather, Catalonia should leverage the momentum created by its separatist movement to engineer a special status within Spain which gives them the economic and cultural autonomy it so desires.
Secession would be detrimental to both Spain’s and Catalonia’s economies. Catalonia is a vital part of Spain’s economy, accounting for around 19% of the national GDP and 25% of foreign exports, primarily to the European Union (EU). Should Catalonia decide to secede, then their access to the EU would likely be jeopardized. Moreover, because its economy is largely dependent on exports to the rest of Europe, it is imperative that Catalonia maintains its status as part of the EU. However, the process of accession into the EU after seceding from one of its member states will likely prove difficult. For a country to join the EU, all member states have to agree upon its membership: considering the current tensions between Spain and Catalonia and the general attitude of the EU towards secession, this seems unlikely. Even if the member states agree upon Catalonia’s membership, it must meet certain GDP and debt criteria to use the Euro; although its GDP is certainly considerable, Catalonia owes Spain a debt of nearly 52 billion euros ($61 billion), which may prove prohibitive to Euro access. Although it is possible to use the Euro without official access to the Eurozone, as Kosovo and Montenegro do, doing so would deny Catalonia access to the European Central Bank–a significant economic blow. A Catalan secession would also likely create a domino effect, encouraging other culturally distinct regions such as Basque Country to secede as well, further dividing and fractioning Spain.
However, the Catalan secessionist movement is not entirely homogeneous in its motives. While a combination of traditional conservative and liberal parties and the far more radical CUP were able to form a pro-independence coalition, these diverse members cite a variety of reasons behind their support of independence. Although the parties agree upon the common goal of independence today, they are likely to quickly fracture should Catalonia become independent due to their larger divergent and contradictory political, economic, and social opinions. Already, the CUP is threatening the leadership of Puigdemont if he does not declare independence immediately, foreshadowing the political turmoil into which Catalonia would be thrown as an infant state.
Meanwhile, Spain’s actions in the region are making it increasingly unpopular among Catalans. Prime Minister Rajoy seems increasingly unlikely to favor negotiations, taking the stance that nothing but a complete withdrawal of the Catalan claim to independence is acceptable. As he continues to take a hardline stance on secession, separatists in Catalonia are growing increasingly galvanized. Although most opposition parties in Madrid support Rajoy’s goal of a unified Spain, Podemos, a far-left party, is pushing for a nationwide referendum on Catalonia’s status. As the Spanish government takes steps to institute a caretaker administration in Catalonia under Article 155, it makes it seem even more authoritarian in the eyes of the frustrated Catalan people. This situation serves only to create further tensions in Catalonia, making the region more likely to explode into conflict.
At this point, the best outcome for both sides, Spanish and Catalan alike, cannot be achieved by political strong-arming: instead, it must be reached at the discussion table. Representatives of Catalonia and Spain must come to an agreement which does not involve Catalonia forming a new state, but instead devolves more power to its already semi-autonomous government while offering Catalonia the fiscal fairness it has been long requesting. An agreement of this sort would not completely satisfy both sides, but it is the best route to take if the possibly devastating effects of political fracture are to be avoided. Such a compromise would satisfy the concerns of many, but not all, economic separatists and allow Catalonia to maintain its cultural integrity while also saving Spain’s federal government the headache of a full-blown constitutional crisis.
Once an agreement is reached, it must be complemented with an additional fair referendum to be considered legitimate. A model for this lies in the Scottish Independence referendum of 2014, in which Prime Minister David Cameron’s effective explanation of the consequences of independence led to the majority of Scottish citizens voting to remain part of Great Britain. Once terms, which would include cultural and economic protections for Catalonia, are negotiated, they could be offered to the Catalan people along with the possible implications of a full secession. Because the Catalan independence is associated far less with far-right nationalism but more with rather rational and valid cultural and economic arguments, it is likely that favorable terms would be enough to convince the majority of Catalans to remain within Spain in a new referendum. However, should Catalonia vote to leave Spain in a free, fair referendum with wide turnout despite full cognizance of the consequences of such a move, then clearly the conviction behind the Catalan independence movement is strong enough for all parties to accept its inevitability.