At age 23, Nathan Law Kwun-chung, a leader of the student protest movement in Hong Kong against perceived mainland Chinese overreach, became the youngest person ever to win a seat in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. But Hong Kong’s legislative elections, which were held on September 4, were notable for more than Law’s success at the polling booths. They were also the first major elections since the widely publicized pro-democracy protests of 2014, the very ones that led to Law’s prominence. As such, the elections were a barometer of Hong Kong’s political climate in the lead-up to next year’s chief executive elections, which will decide the city’s next top official. In particular, the surprising success of several candidates advocating self-determination suggests that the 2014 protests, though long abated, have left their mark on Hong Kong’s politics, complicating the city’s fraught relationship with Beijing even further and upending the traditional political order.
Hong Kong’s peculiar status as a Special Administrative Region dates back to 1997, when it was returned to China after 155 years of British rule. Under a Chinese-British agreement known as “one-country, two-systems,” along with a mini-Constitution creatively named “Basic Law,” the city was granted considerable political and economic autonomy despite nominally being a part of the Chinese state. The city maintained its own semi-democratic elections and liberties of speech, press, and assembly not granted in mainland China.
However, some Hong Kongers have voiced their disaffection over perceived infringements on the agreement, accusing the Chinese central government in Beijing of encroaching on their autonomy by trying to exert too much influence on the city’s politics. Since the handover from British to Chinese rule in 1997, protests have been a regular feature of the opposition to a series of administrations denounced by some as too beholden to Beijing, especially in recent years. Much of the opposition stems from the fact that many Hong Kongers arrived as asylum-seekers in the 1950s and 60s, fleeing political persecution in mainland China.
Tensions increased in 2014 when Beijing tabled a reform package which had promised universal suffrage in the 2017 chief executive election. The new model would have replaced the closed-door system historically used to decide the chief executive with universal suffrage, as long as all candidates were first screened by central authorities, to ensure that – in the words of Basic Law Committee Chairman Li Fei – the chief executive “loves the country and loves Hong Kong.” This caveat takes on a particular resonance given that the chief executive is not just a prime ministerial figure in the region but also the Chinese government’s main representative in Hong Kong. That facet of the reform proposal was met with outrage, particularly among student groups from local universities. Several such groups used social media to organize sit-ins and peaceful rallies in front of government offices. The initially small-scale protests soon escalated into an internationally publicized campaign known as the Umbrella Movement. For several months, up to 100,000 citizens protested, demanding greater autonomy and democratic reforms.
However, both the public and the government eventually grew tired of the stalemate, and businesses became frustrated with structures blocking the streets. The Umbrella Movement fizzled out after 79 days, seemingly failing to achieve any of its main objectives, such as genuine universal suffrage and the chief executive’s resignation. In turn, the city’s Legislative Council rejected the Chinese proposal, continuing the undemocratic chief executive election process. But despite the disappointing short-term outcome, the recent Legislative Council elections indicate the lasting impact of the Umbrella Movement.
The Legislative Council, first formed in 1991, has often been beset by gridlock, particularly in the last few years. This is partly due to the complicated, semi-democratic process by which its members are chosen: Its 70 seats are divided into 35 from geographical constituencies, 30 from functional constituencies, and five so-called super seats. Registered voters elect the combined 40 members based on geographical constituencies and super seats while the remaining 30 members are elected by traditional influential business and industry sectors in Hong Kong, such as the Agriculture and Fisheries, Finance, and Medical fields. Corporate votes given to associations or companies in certain industries give business owners immense political power, and the vast network of monopolies in Hong Kong allow tycoons such as Li Ka-shing, the wealthiest man in Asia, to cast several ballots at once.
Similar to the two-party system in the United States, there are two traditional rival camps in Hong Kong politics – pro-establishment and pan-democrat. Unsurprisingly, most functional constituencies, representing business interests that often rely on the mainland’s resources and market size, elect pro-establishment legislative councilors, who tend to explicitly support Beijing’s views. The pan-democrats, who have usually favored more autonomy and democratic procedures, try to counter the influence yielded by their rivals. Often lacking the numbers needed to vote down bills they oppose, pan-democrats’ most used tactic has been extensive filibustering, a strategy that has earned them a reputation of obstructionism, especially among Beijing-friendly media outlets.
However, the latest election, the first since the Umbrella Movement, seems to defy this trend. To begin with, a record 2.2 million citizens, or 58 percent of registered voters, voted in a city where politics barely reaches the dinner table. The campaigns were intense and garnered high amounts of domestic and international media attention. The pan-democrat camp ultimately won 19 of the 35 available geographical constituency seats, eight seats in the functional constituencies, and three of the super seats, totaling about 40 percent of the seats and consolidating its now more-than-sufficient one-third minority veto power.
Even more surprising, however, was the success of young candidates running for new parties founded during or immediately after the Umbrella Movement two years prior, including Demosisto, Youngspiration, and Civic Passion. Behind these peculiar names is a new type of political party in Hong Kong politics: In defiance of the long-established binaries of pro-establishment and pan-democrat camps, a whole host of new candidates have set themselves apart in structure and stance. These self-termed “localists” have been described as an indigenous movement that claims to put the interests of Hong Kong permanent residents first – particularly grassroots social issues like a universal minimum pension. In many ways, they align with traditional pan-democrats, but go above and beyond in their vehement opposition to what they perceive as the encroachment of Chinese authorities on Hong Kong’s political, cultural, and legal autonomy, a process termed “mainlandization.”
Nathan Law Kwun-chung, a college student, is one of the most prominent of the 26 new members. After becoming one of the leaders of the Umbrella Movement, he co-founded and successfully ran for Demosisto, making him the youngest Legco member ever. Legco member-elect Yau Wai-ching of Youngspiration is the youngest female member ever at 25 years of age. Eddie Chu of the Land Justice League, a pan-democrat running on a platform against what he calls the “government-business-landlord-triad collusion,” gained the most votes in this election with 84,121 votes, earning himself the moniker “King of Votes.”
The small, but nonetheless significant success of these new parties suggests their previously-deemed radical ideas are already becoming more mainstream. Self-determination, in particular, has become a far larger issue, especially given that in 2047, the 50-year-old “one country, two systems” contract with China ends. In turn, many young reformers advocate that Hong Kong should democratically decide whether it wants complete legal and political integration into China or something else, like maintaining a state of perpetual Basic Law that the current system works under. Following the recent elections, this concept of self-determination has a new voice in the Legco through new members like Eddie Chu, Nathan Law, and Yau Wai-ching.
Given the remarkable political change, these political newcomers still face significant, institutional obstacles to limiting Chinese influence. The functional constituencies system ensures that a small minority of voters can keep a large pro-establishment voting bloc in Legco, and Beijing continues to fund pro-establishment parties and campaigns through its high-profile liaison office in the city. Furthermore, in an unprecedented move, all Legco candidates this year had to sign an oath confirming their allegiance to Basic Law, which establishes Hong Kong as an inseparable part of China, as a condition to be on the ballot, and at least five candidates were barred from running because of their separatist sympathies.
Obstacles notwithstanding, the success of what could become a new political faction may upend the traditional split between the two camps. While the pro-establishment groups will likely remain unified, increasing political polarization may threaten the traditional unity of the pan-democrats, possibly leading to a more volatile Legco less wedded to the idea of Basic Law itself. In fact, the age-old pan-democrat label may fall out of favor, as the anti-establishment parties become increasingly divided between the pan-democrat, self-determinist, and localist factions. As a result, cooperation may become a challenge, particularly since some newcomers, like Nathan Law, have announced that they will only be joining positions with the traditional pan-democrat parties on a case-by-case basis, following discussion with his few co-factional allies first. One thing is for certain: democratic self-determination in 2017 has already become a major part of public political discourse. However, as City University Professor Yip Kin-man states, “If [self-determination] becomes too much of an issue, Beijing may take a harsher position, in turn provoking a larger reaction from the more radical factions – which may become a downward spiral.” This means that while the more radical, localist parties now have a platform to advocate their concerns, they must be careful to avoid becoming figureheads for further legislative gridlock and reprisals from mainland China.
The makeup and context of this year’s newly elected Legco members may disrupt the anti-establishment camp’s ability to challenge pro-establishment parties, despite being elected in response to nearly twenty years of governments beholden to Beijing. But if pan-democrats and newly elected Legco parties wish to remain a legitimate check on the pro-establishment groups, they must remain as unified as possible – and that sometimes means compromising instead of adhering to hardline stances, as well as finding satisfaction in bringing issues like self-determination to light, even if action on them is slow. A likely litmus test of the new legislative body will be the upcoming chief executive elections of 2017 – not because Legco members will select the new leader, but because of the election’s inevitable controversy – and Legco’s response. Charting the future of Hong Kong and its citizens requires a sensible, rational Legco that is willing to compromise both internally and with Beijing, but only time will tell if this new chamber is up to the task.