Cryptographers are preparing for the end times. “Q-Day”—the moment when quantum computers become sufficiently advanced and accessible that commonplace digital security systems are instantly rendered unviable—is fast approaching. But Q-Day’s apocalyptic effects will not be felt equally. The unique inability of developing nations to safeguard against digital vulnerabilities threatens to resurrect the techno-colonialism of the Cold War.
The security of commonplace cryptographic systems rests on computationally difficult math problems. Cracking the RSA cryptographic security protocol, used for secure communication and digital authentication, requires factoring a huge number (i.e. hundreds of digits long), a task that would take a classical computer trillions of years to accomplish. The gravity of the threat posed to traditional cryptographic systems by quantum computers—a nebulous topic for most—stems from their fundamental makeup. Whereas their classical counterparts rely on lines of binary bits (zeros or ones), quantum computers utilize ‘qubits,’ which exist as a simultaneous superposition of zeros and ones. As a result of qubits’ improved data-storing capabilities, quantum computers are incredibly quick: In 1994, mathematician Peter Shor demonstrated that a large quantum computer could crack RSA in just 10 seconds.
Though experts have insisted that a functional quantum computer has been decades away for the past 30 years, credible evidence now suggests that Q-Day will occur within the decade. Last year, Harvard’s Quantum Initiative derived a working solution to the high error rate of qubits, which had previously rendered quantum computers unreliable. IBM is shifting toward developing compatible software, paving the way for quantum computing to become widely accessible.
The prospect of unhindered decryption and global surveillance has spurred many of America’s peers to develop their own quantum computers. Russia produced a 16-qubit system last July and China is already poised to outstrip US private-sector development. Last year, McKinsey estimated that the Chinese Communist Party spent $15.3 billion on quantum computing research, far exceeding the US government’s $3.7 billion. In response, the Biden administration floated restrictions on American investment in Chinese-led production of quantum hardware.
Should a foreign rival develop a quantum computer, the implications for international security will be profound. Secure communication with overseas spies will become unfeasible, military operations will be impossible to effect covertly, and diplomatic negotiations will no longer be able to occur digitally. A quantum computer offers as much insight into our virtual past as our virtual future: Numerous intelligence agencies are storing encrypted internet traffic now to decrypt later, thereby gaining access to swathes of digital communications from the past decade.
While the growing competition between the United States and China to improve quantum hardware and software garners international attention, a quieter––though no less urgent––race to shore up digital defenses rages in the background.
Q-Day may not spell the end of digital civilization. Last year, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) endorsed the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm as a quantum-safe alternative to public-key cryptography. Unlike RSA, the security of the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm, a ‘lattice-based’ cryptosystem, relies upon a math problem whose complexity surpasses even quantum computers’ computational ability. While lattice-based cryptography is still maturing, it is widely accepted as the most economical successor to existing quantum-unsafe cryptography.
This is hardly a free lunch, however. The switch to quantum-safe cryptosystems is a tall order, even for wealthy nations. The complete overhaul of digital security standards is still embryonic, as NIST remains bogged down in ensuring the safety of CRYSTALS-Kyber and its sibling systems. Nor will the transition be quick: The widespread implementation of new standards for symmetric-key cryptosystems (another type of quantum-unsafe cryptosystem) in 2001 and secure communication in 1998 each took over 15 years to complete. Even eliminating the usage of public-key cryptography is a Sisyphean task: many corporations are woefully unaware of which quantum-unsafe cryptosystems are ingrained in their software, necessitating a full rewrite of widely used programs.
We are not moving quickly enough. Above all logistical issues, the time-frame challenge is most harrowing: The Biden administration’s deadline for migration to lattice-based cryptography is 2035, a date that will likely lag far behind Q-Day, which could be five years away. The federal government’s first––albeit skeletal––step toward ensuring digital privacy must be the rapid implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber in the state’s most critical functions, such as Department of Defense and CIA communications, and in digital commerce to prevent a possible financial collapse. NIST also cannot abandon the private sector, which will need support to secure its systems and transition to a post-quantum future.
But while the United States and other developed nations at least possess the infrastructure to prevent digital cataclysm, such infrastructure is inaccessible to much of the Global South. Post-quantum migration requires clear, top-down protocols––a challenge for governments operating in wartime or combatting financial precarity. Nations without wealthy private sectors to test protocol development will struggle further. Implementing lattice-based cryptosystems will be a remote concern for countries with already unreliable digital infrastructure.
Reliance on classical cryptosystems will cripple the evolution of the Global South in a post-quantum world. Internet access and digital development, crucial steps for internal economic growth, are conditioned on cybersecurity. Quantum computing will render advancements toward secure telecommunications and online banking redundant––threatening to return developing nations to the pre-digital era. Additionally, the vulnerability of cryptocurrencies risks disaster for cryptocurrency-reliant middle and lower-income nations, as a quarter of all Bitcoins currently in circulation are susceptible to theft by quantum computers. Abandoning cryptocurrencies without a secure digital banking alternative will further divorce developing nations from global markets.
Q-Day’s gravest possible repercussion is a resurgence of the techno-colonial relationship between the “Third World” and the West that first arose during the Cold War. Amidst struggles for global influence with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, the CIA partnered with Crypto AG, a Swiss manufacturer, to sell ciphers (a precursor to digital cryptosystems) to non-aligned nations that could not manufacture their own––dubbed ‘Operation Rubicon.’ These ciphers contained weaknesses that only the CIA could exploit, thereby allowing the United States to “read approximately half” of all secret messages dispatched by said states.
As US-China competition grows fiercer, either power could leverage their quantum computers to surveil exploitable nations, disrupt their governments’ digital procedures, and threaten the free election of “undesirable” candidates by manipulating electoral data. The modern world order may regress to the exploiter-and-exploited binary of 19th-century imperialism. Nations with access to and defense against quantum computing stand to exploit those with insecure data. The stakes are clear: Spurred by global posturing and jingoism, the US-China quantum race could decide the war for influence over Asia and Africa—and disable the superpower status of the losing party.
The Global South’s existential danger could be easily mitigated, should a benevolent power furnish it with the resources to implement CRYSTALS-Kyber. Pragmatically, though, it is unlikely that such a benefactor will be found, and the Global South will again lose a fight it did not wage. History repeats itself—and if no radical change occurs soon, the already vulnerable will find themselves in dire straits when Q-Day finally arrives.