Since its 1998 creation, the International Space Station (ISS) has been a beacon of science, exploration, and space diplomacy. Research conducted both for and on the ISS has led to numerous scientific advancements, from new approaches in cancer treatment and ultrasound procedures to the development of robot manufacturing arms and the enhancement of food preservation. Even in the face of diplomatic trials, like Russia’s threats to pull out of the project in 2022, this joint operation of five foreign agencies has stood the test of time, allowing more than 23 nations to reach space peacefully. However, technological limits are bringing the ISS to an end. In 2031, the 400-ton, football field-sized station will be safely deorbited and decommissioned, leaving a vacuum in space operations. While the path charted by the ISS was one of multilateralism and cooperation, what comes next for space exploration is less clear.
The current future of space exploration reflects the modern terrestrial geopolitical climate, with the emergence of two key blocs. China, historically separated from the ISS and banned from partnership with NASA, launched its own low Earth orbit space station, Tiangong, in 2021. With an expected lifespan of over 15 years, this independently constructed, expandable, three-module station is a sign of Chinese strength and interest in space exploration. The autonomous nature of the station grants China significant diplomatic power. Soon, the country will be well-positioned to host the many countries it claims are privately vying to send their astronauts to space, as Beijing dictates Tiangong’s operations without needing any form of multilateral consensus.
In 2022, the European Space Agency (ESA) pulled out of Tiangong partnership discussions due to budgetary reasons and political misalignment, a significant blow to China’s aspirations of becoming a leader in space diplomacy. At the same time, the ESA has been actively collaborating with the Artemis Accords, a US-led initiative founded in 2020 on principles of rules-based behavior, including transparency, peaceful exploration, and compliance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the Registration Convention. The 43-state bloc has been considering plans for a new lunar-orbiting station called Gateway, designed to continue research and increase access to moon exploration, Mars, and deep space.
While Artemis’s Gateway project points toward the bloc’s aspirations of a multilateral space presence, Russia and China’s absence from the group undermines the integrity of these ambitions. Russia chose not to sign the Artemis Accords because of its position outside the UN and the organization’s perceived pro-American nature. China, on the other hand, has been congressionally prohibited from working with the United States in space matters since 2011 thanks to the Wolf Amendment, which sought to pressure China to ameliorate human rights grievances but only “pushed [the state] to develop parallel capabilities on its own.” With such significant actors missing, Gateway cannot be categorized as effectively multilateral. In a world of alarming great power tensions, the United States must again treat space exploration as a domain of cooperation rather than an extension of competition with actors like China.
History can serve as a guide for both parties. Shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia signed an agreement “in which they pledged to collaborate and have their crew members fly on each other’s vehicles.” Despite domestic tensions, this partnership paved the way for the joint ISS project and brought the two superpowers closer together. Additionally, by using space and science—areas that inspire citizens and leaders alike—to meet Russia in partnership, the United States netted “collateral foreign policy benefits” such as multilateral inter-continental missile arms control. Today, such alignment between great powers can overflow into other foreign policy matters, facilitating collaboration across the board.
Moreover, while diplomacy was a major objective of bringing Russia into the ISS mission, space multilateralism brought about substantial cost and efficiency benefits as well. For example, NASA relied entirely on Russian Soyuz rockets to get American astronauts to the ISS from 2011 to 2020. Without this cooperation, the United States would have been forced to develop its own capabilities, costing precious time and money. Even now, as the United States increasingly becomes self-sufficient due to advancements from companies like SpaceX, its exclusionary stance limits its capabilities. China is spending massive amounts on space development and is projected to become a major space power by 2030. Further, the low Earth orbit of China’s Tiangong could be useful for the United States and its Artemis allies, which are planning to create a base in lunar orbit. It is wasteful and technologically inefficient for both the United States and China to spend money on research and development that could be shared to expedite space exploration. Terrestrial disagreements must not bleed into space policy when considering the transformative possibilities of greater space cooperation.
More severe issues than wastefulness arise from disjointed space-tech diplomacy. Space is an unforgiving climate in which operations can go wrong for many reasons. More than 3,000 satellites orbit Earth today, meaning accidental collisions are possible. Beyond technological and monetary losses, these collisions create space debris that can disrupt other space activities. Because one collision can cause thousands of pieces of debris, even slight misalignments or delayed communications between satellite-operating states could be costly. For example, an accidental collision between American and Russian satellites in 2009 created more than “2300 trackable fragments.” At the extreme, collisions can cascade and create a domino effect called the Kessler Syndrome, which can cause entire orbital regions to reach a “critical mass” and become unusable—making future launches difficult or impossible.
Additionally, if states continue to view space exploration as a venue for competition, they may be incentivized to intentionally claim or dominate key space territories like Lagrange points—space “parking spots” where capabilities can stay “in a fixed position with minimal fuel consumption”—or the south side of the Moon. Because modern international law does not sufficiently regulate space conduct, such disagreements could escalate and cause a weaponization of space. We could see existing states attack orbiting bases, disrupt satellites that are crucial to daily life, or, in the most extreme case, weaponize future bases. Fostering an international community of space collaboration is essential to protecting global security and creating international mechanisms for space-conflict resolution.
No matter how contentious global politics may seem today, the history of the ISS demonstrates that space can be the great unifier, forging competing nations into a coalition of efficient scientific and technological partnerships. With debris agglomeration and space militarization posing significant threats to all space ventures, the costs are too high for competing space blocs to go down exclusive paths. The first step toward tangible change in space cooperation would be for the United States to lift the Wolf Amendment ban on Chinese space cooperation. This bold move is necessary to incite further conversation over the future of space collaboration. With Chinese President Xi Jinping showing a personal desire for space exploration, a clear opportunity exists. Further, as the state with more advanced space technology, the United States should bear the security risk of scientific collaboration with its adversary and lead the international community by taking a leap of faith that paves the way for meaningful great power space cooperation. Such a noble step could be the accelerant that ensures humanity’s multiplanetary existence and this generation’s Mars landing.