Fifty years ago, on April 13, 1975, the Lebanese Civil War officially began. The war devastated Lebanon’s economy, infrastructure, and social structure, and culminated in a sectarian model of democracy that persists to this day. Unless Lebanon discards its current system of governance, which facilitates division and factionalism, Lebanon’s future will be characterized by corruption, stagnation, and crisis.
Lebanon courted prosperity in the early 1970s. It had a booming economy, peacefully accommodated a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups, and attracted artists, aristocrats, socialites, and writers. Beirut—Lebanon’s once-glorious capital city—was often called the “Paris of the Middle East.” In fact, Beirut was so successful in its design that it inspired the layout of the beach development in Tel Aviv.
Lebanon is a ‘sectarian democracy’: a multifactorial country where the dominant faction has a democratic government that discriminates against minority factions. Sectarianism is essentially a division that determines how people interact in their daily lives, influences citizens’ personal legal status, and shapes the organization of political parties; religion becomes individuals’ defining characteristic. For example, top political positions are allocated based on religious affiliation—the president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shi’a Muslim—effectively barring members of other sects from ascending to national leadership. Additionally, civil matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance are governed by religious courts rather than a unified civil code, which leads to unequal treatment and legal outcomes depending on one’s sect.
Lebanon’s population comprises 67.6 percent Muslims, 32.4 percent Christians, and 4.52 percent Druze (a small religious group in the Middle East with unique beliefs that mix elements from different doctrines). Smaller groups within these categories and denominations comprise all 18 different sects recognized by the Lebanese government. This governing system was heavily enforced by French colonizers in the early to mid-20th century, intentionally reinforcing divisions to prevent the emergence of a unified nationalist movement that might challenge colonial rule. Until 1989, government positions were allotted in a 6:5 ratio in favor of the majority party: the Christians. The large influx of Muslim Palestinians from the late 1960s to the early 1970s challenged the status quo and heightened tensions between the Christian and Muslim Lebanese.
Lebanon’s proximity to conflicts in Syria and Israel helped ignite its civil war. Following the disputes between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from 1967 to 1970, Lebanon accepted a large influx of Palestinian refugees—over 300,000 by 1975. Fighting between Lebanon’s Christian-dominated government and the growing Muslim minority erupted, lasting over 15 years. Syria, Israel, and Iran intervened and backed warring factions. Hezbollah emerged and still plays a significant role in world affairs today.
The conflict ended in 1989 with the Taif Agreement, which introduced constitutional reforms based on the principle of ‘mutual coexistence’ among Lebanon’s sects. It made balanced sectarian representation a central goal of parliamentary electoral law by mandating a 50:50 ratio between Christian and Muslim representatives in parliament, replacing the previous 6:5 Christian-to-Muslim ratio. This shift transferred political power away from the Maronite Christian sect, which had historically held a disproportionate share of influence, in order to promote greater parity between the country’s main religious communities. At the same time, the agreement reaffirmed Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing model by continuing to reserve key government positions for specific sects—for example, maintaining the requirement that the president be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shi’a Muslim.
While this restructuring aimed to ensure equality across factions, it also entrenched sectarian divisions by formalizing religious affiliations within the political system, locking Lebanon into a fragile and often dysfunctional power-sharing model that has hindered reform and governance for decades. Fifty years later, the Taif Agreement continues to wreak irreparable damage on Lebanon’s governing systems and economic infrastructure. Lebanon’s sectarianism has stalled economic reform: Approximately 80 percent of the population lives in poverty, and 36 percent reside below the extreme poverty line. The public sector and the government do not necessarily recruit based on qualifications since quotas must be met, meaning a certain number of individuals from each sect must be chosen to fill these jobs, even if they are not the most qualified.
These issues all point to the same root source: sectarianism. Lebanese society is intensely polarized, with each religious faction prioritizing its own interests over national stability and unity. For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), since May 2020, has been negotiating with Lebanon’s government for a “rescue package” of financial aid that would help alleviate the nation’s economic collapse. As part of the negotiation, the IMF called for the government to introduce a “banking secrecy law” requiring financial institutions to maintain records and file reports on certain financial transactions to help detect and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. However, because of sectarian quarrels, political leaders failed to agree on implementing these reforms, leaving the government paralyzed and without a rescue package.
Additionally, after President Michel Suleiman’s term ended in May 2014, the parliament could not secure the majority needed to elect a president until October 2016, leaving the office vacant for almost two and a half years despite over 30 votes being held. The presidency, traditionally held by a Maronite Christian, became a point of contention among different sectarian groups. This stalemate directly resulted from the political deadlock among key sectarian factions.
Despite the issues it presents, sectarianism continues to persist because it benefits the political elite of Lebanon, who have heavily invested in maintaining a sectarian system in order to maintain power and control over resources. Sectarianism enables ‘patronage networks’ where political leaders secure votes and loyalty by offering services and benefits to their sectarian constituencies, often at the expense of broader national interests. Sectarian leaders distribute resources to their own followers, ensuring continued loyalty and giving leaders and politicians an incentive to support the sectarian system. Additionally, sectarian identity is so deeply entrenched in the social fabric of Lebanon, as it has existed and been reinforced for generations, that individuals share a strong sense of loyalty to their sectarian group, making it challenging to promote national unity over sectarian identity. The system has led to a fragmentation of society, where different groups may view their political, social, and economic interests as tied to their religious affiliation.
This raises the question of whether a unified Lebanese identity can overcome deeply rooted sectarian divisions, and whether national belonging can outweigh loyalty to one’s sect. The sectarian model perpetuates a cycle of divisiveness and calamity, and the nation’s prosperity depends on confronting and overcoming that cycle. One possible solution lies in electoral reform. Currently, corrupt practices like gerrymandering are used to ensure that districts are religiously uniform so that the majority community ends up having a more significant influence over who wins the seats allocated for the minority communities. Moving away from similar practices that entrench sectarian division, and instead transitioning toward a system that encourages political parties to appeal to broader, national constituencies rather than narrow sectarian interests, could help depoliticize the divisions between religious groups and promote cross-sectarian alliances. One possible model is the adoption of a proportional representation system with a single national electoral district, as used in South Africa, where parties must gain support across racial and ethnic lines to win seats, encouraging inclusive platforms and coalition-building.
The rise and strengthening of grassroots movements and community-based organizations could also bring attention to this matter and rally support that transcends sectarian lines. This was showcased in the 2019 Lebanese protests, when people crossed sectarian divides to collectively protest against the government’s planned taxes on gasoline, tobacco, and some social media platforms. During the protests, a chant—“killun yaani killun” (Arabic for “all of them means all of them”)—became a widely used slogan, with “them” referring to all of Lebanon’s political parties. The slogan expressed total rejection of the entire political class, regardless of sect or affiliation, and demanded accountability from all leaders, not just a few. This was one of the few instances where people across different sects and political parties united to advocate for political change. Although these protests ultimately did not impact the tax policies, it does not mean that the continuation of protests and grassroots movements could not help guide the country toward a unified system of governance, one that prioritizes national solidarity over sectarian division.
It is difficult to predict whether unity will be a viable path forward; Lebanon’s religious sects remain deeply polarized, and most political elites continue to resist interfactional cooperation. Yet, if dissatisfied Lebanese citizens can channel their frustration into sustained pressure for electoral reform, demanding changes that reduce sectarian influence in party politics and reward cross-sectarian coalitions, there remains hope. With a system that incentivizes national platforms over factional loyalty, Lebanon may finally begin to break free from the cycles of corruption, stagnation, and crisis that have defined its recent history.