“We will shoot you all,” (“Site ke ve strelame”) tweeted politician Dimitar Apasiev after his party, Levica, a far-left nationalist political party in North Macedonia, secured its first two seats in the National Assembly during the 2020 parliamentary elections. Since then, Levica has made significant gains, securing six seats in the National Assembly during the 2024 parliamentary elections, despite North Macedonia electing a new right-wing government. Levica was formed in 2015 through a merger of various leftist movements, including the Communist Party of Macedonia. According to one of the party’s founders, Levica’s initial goal was to offer a Marxist platform where workers could unite. It was formed as a multiethnic party aiming to address the demands of the 2011–2014 protest movements directed at police brutality, rising electricity prices, and the mistreatment of refugees. However, in 2019, intraparty tensions led to a coup against the coalition’s ethnic minority members—orchestrated by current leader Apasiev and his followers—signaling Levica’s transformation into a leftist ethno-nationalist party.
Levica is not an anomaly. Across Europe, a new form of nationalism is emerging. Populist leftist parties are embracing nativist rhetoric and advocating for a traditionally right-wing form of nationalism using “leftist” justifications. Even though these parties promote left-wing policies and support workers’ rights, they simultaneously advocate for economic protectionism, national sovereignty, EU skepticism, and restrictive immigration policies driven by anti-NATO and antiglobalist ideas. While most left-wing populists have found limited success in the polls, the emergence of a nationalist left signals a concerning turn to nativism across Europe—even in traditionally progressive spaces known to safeguard the rights of minorities and immigrants.
Former members of Levica have revealed that the coup in North Macedonia stemmed from Apasiev’s growing support for right-wing initiatives, culminating in a proposal to back a right-wing presidential candidate in the 2019 election. Under Apasiev’s leadership, Levica transformed from a party representing exploited workers from all ethnic groups in North Macedonia to one intent on Macedonian nationalism. Apasiev spearheaded partisan promises to revoke legislation that empowered ethnic minority groups, such as the Law on Languages, a bill passed in 2018 that integrated the use of minority languages in government institutions. Levica’s advocacy against the 2018 Prespa Agreement, which changed the country’s name to North Macedonia after a decades-long name dispute with Greece, particularly appealed to those who felt humiliated by foreign “threats” to national identity. Apasiev’s most extreme social media posts have called for the exclusion of ethnic Albanians from the state’s vision of ‘the people.’ Such ostracization is grounded in far-right pseudoscientific narratives in North Macedonia that claim Albanians’ origins lie outside of Europe and that they are “culturally and civilisationally” incompatible with the Macedonian state.
Apasiev and Levica take inspiration from other left-wing populist leaders like Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France, who similarly advocates for economic nationalism. Unlike Mélenchon’s party, La France Insoumise, which avoids explicitly dividing people based on ethnic identity, Levica actively promotes exclusionary and chauvinistic rhetoric. Nevertheless, even if they are not outwardly xenophobic, the economic policies promoted by leftist populist parties often entail the ostracization of groups that do not fit an ethno-nationalist conception of the ‘nation.’ For instance, a prominent reason behind their skepticism of the EU is the refugee crisis in Europe, which is portrayed as a threat to both the national economy and native cultural preservation. Since 2016, 13.2 million refugees fleeing conflicts from places like Syria, Afghanistan, and Ukraine have sought asylum in Europe, putting a strain on EU governments that have agreed to manage migration. This has only exacerbated public outrage and proliferated nationalist sentiments.
In Southern Europe, movements like Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain emerged in opposition to EU-imposed austerity measures aimed at reducing government debt. Following the 2008 financial crisis, austerity measures led to cuts in public spending and, consequently, a deterioration of healthcare and other social services. They also reduced wages and pensions, which directly impacted the quality of life of working-class people. Spurred by general economic discontent, parties like the Bulgarian Socialist Party, Zivi Zid in Croatia, and Ne Da(vi)mo Beograd in Serbia have emerged across the region, framing their economic struggles as a matter of national sovereignty and blaming foreign financial institutions for job losses and wage cuts. Under the guise of tackling Western imperialism and preserving native cultures, these parties often advocate for cutting ties with the EU and forging closer relationships with Russia and China.
In Western Europe, the rationale behind left-wing populism is slightly different. Opposition to free trade and protectionist economic policies are seen as addressing “the needs of the common man.” This resistance to trade openness is shared by leftist parties like the Socialistische Partij (SP) in the Netherlands and Die Linke in Germany, as well as right-wing populist parties like France’s Front National and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands—all of whom are critical of trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Die Linke frames its skepticism toward the EU open border policy as a sovereignty issue, arguing that EU bureaucracy serves corporate interests by driving down wages and straining public services meant for native citizens. This sentiment is echoed by Italy’s Movimento 5 Stelle, which emphasizes Italian national identity in its anti-EU and anti-NATO stances. In line with these economic measures, restrictive immigration policies are not explicitly advocated for on an ethnic basis but are understood as a method of “protecting workers” or preserving social welfare systems. Nationalism is seen as the only way of safeguarding the rights of domestic workers, often resulting in xenophobic rhetoric targeting immigrants who are “undeserving” of jobs and welfare benefits.
The new nationalist left is turning national pride into a progressive value, adopting nativism in their leftist agendas that claim to center the common man. What underlies their protectionist economic policies and critiques of globalization, however, is the idea of an exclusionary European welfare state that shields native citizens from “harmful” foreign economic and cultural influences. These parties offer a completely new flavor of nationalism that justifies destructive and often ethno-nationalist policies with a leftist rationale, ultimately diluting and manipulating progressivism for their own populist gains. Their emphasis on constructing a homogeneous national identity that must be protected from minority groups and refugees reveals a broader shift towards chauvinism in Europe that should be closely observed in the coming years.