On September 13, 2024, two German Navy vessels sailed through the Taiwan Strait, marking the first time German warships had crossed the geopolitically fragile waterway in two decades. This transit drew strong condemnation from the Chinese government, with a foreign ministry spokesperson stating, “We firmly oppose provocations and endangering of China’s sovereignty and security under the banner of ‘freedom of navigation.’” The Taiwan Strait, an 81-mile-wide major shipping corridor that separates the eastern coast of mainland China and the western coast of Taiwan, is one of the most contested waters in the world. The People’s Republic of China claims full sovereignty and jurisdiction over the strait, while the United States and Taiwan’s de-facto government maintain that it is an international waterway.
Freedom of navigation operations—intentional movement through contested waters to enforce international law—are routine for countries like the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, which have long established their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific and, more implicitly, to the security of Taiwan. However, Germany’s transit represents a more widespread shift in approach to the region. The incident comes at a time when the United States is increasing its scrutiny of the Indo-Pacific and could be a sign of greater European interest in the region’s security, particularly in Taiwan. But if this is the case, Germany and others must proceed with caution. European nations have great potential to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan, but they must recognize that rash and fragmented policy signals risk triggering conflict.
With the territory of its member states in Europe, North America, and the Middle East as its official domain of responsibility, NATO had seldom deemed the affairs of Asia and the Pacific a top priority. So what has prompted the North Atlantic alliance’s apparent shift in focus toward the Indo-Pacific? General economic and political globalization aside, it is largely in the context of the war in Ukraine that Taiwan has drawn concern from European NATO allies.
The outbreak of war in the Taiwan Strait has the potential to become a major conflict between the United States and China, especially considering President Joe Biden’s repeated statements that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense. This matters to Europe in part because the United States has been by far the top contributor to Ukrainian aid, primarily through military assistance amounting to 51.6 billion euros. If the United States were to be drawn into a major war with China, this magnitude of aid to Ukraine could not continue, and a greater burden would fall on European NATO allies to deter Russian aggression.
But perhaps more importantly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has served as a reminder that peace is fragile and (US-backed) deterrence can fail. With the 2016 rise to power of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party, which has a long history of advocating for independence, the possibility of a war over Taiwan is more real than it has been in 30 years. European leaders are looking closer at what conflict in the Pacific would mean for global trade. For European states, despite being in another theater of the world, the stakes are no less significant in Taiwan than they are in Ukraine.
A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would, according to a recent Bloomberg report, cost $10 trillion (10 percent of the world’s GDP) and “decimate the global economy” in ways that Covid-19, the Russo-Ukrainian War, and the 2008 financial crisis have not come close to. There is no question that this conflict would be felt deeply across the world, including in the European Union, which has 40 percent of its external trade passing through the Taiwan Strait and is almost completely reliant on East Asia for manufacturing and semiconductors.
Europe has been quietly increasing its focus on Taiwan in recent years, demonstrated by both the European Union’s 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy and Germany’s recent China Strategy. It is apparent, then, that the recent German transit was not a one-off but rather part of a larger European push to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific. However, it is still unclear what a greater security role for NATO in East Asia will or should look like—and what it would mean for Taiwan.
European involvement in Taiwan poses certain dangers, the greatest being triggering an invasion of the island. Beijing has already warned NATO against strengthening its ties in Asia and interfering with China’s “internal politics”—an allusion to Taiwan, which China considers a domestic issue. Chinese leaders are particularly wary of Western interference, a legacy of the hundred years of subjugation by Western powers during the 19th and early 20th centuries.
The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views Taiwan’s reunification with mainland China as a core political goal. This, combined with the aforementioned sensitivity toward European intervention, means that greater involvement of European NATO members will run the risk of either provoking or spooking China into invading Taiwan (the most drastic option) to avoid losing it forever to foreign interference. This risk is even higher when European leaders act without taking into account Chinese interpretations of and reactions to their operations. A misinterpretation of signals could be the difference between war and peace in a situation as precarious as Taiwan’s.
European policymakers might make several blunders that could trigger these consequences. Already, many politicians in the United States engage in virtue-signaling and careless messaging, especially as it pertains to China. To give just one example, Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) released a statement earlier this year saying, “Taiwan, with its vibrant freedom, stands in stark contrast to Communist China.” Painting the issue of Taiwan’s forced reunification as a battle between democracy and authoritarianism is a common framing strategy in Washington. While this sort of rhetoric may seem natural, it is often used without a concrete purpose other than to send a provocative message. It indicates to the CCP that Western involvement is motivated by an ideological conflict that can never be reconciled, and thus Western powers will never allow Taiwan to be reunified with China peacefully—China must resort to a military approach to reunification.
If European leaders at the highest levels of power were to contribute to this sort of careless symbolic signaling, it could significantly weaken deterrence. Currently, European leaders tend to be less confrontational with Beijing over Taiwan compared to their American counterparts because they have not given as much attention to the issue, but they must be careful not to fall into this trap as they start to shift policy priorities toward Taiwan.
Furthermore, if NATO allies employ fragmented policies toward Taiwan, they risk sending mixed signals to China. For instance, if some European countries were to threaten imposing costs on China in the event of forced reunification, but other nations lack or contradict these commitments, they would undermine any attempt to convince China that it would face consequences for aggression. NATO’s strength comes in its unity, as we have seen in its response in Ukraine. Signaling to China that escalation would not provoke a strong and united European response but a splintered and ineffective one might encourage the CCP to do exactly that. If European nations turn toward the Indo-Pacific, they must reach a consensus on what they intend to do there.
However, despite the variety of ways European involvement could goad Chinese hostility, Europe also has great potential to promote stability in the Taiwan Strait and de-escalate soaring tensions. Europe can play an important role in internationalizing the issue of Taiwan to raise the costs of invasion for China. Chinese leaders have no doubt been watching the conflict in Ukraine and seen how the massive international response has inflicted great costs on Russia and hampered its invasion. By making it clear to China that it is not just the costs of a US response it must account for but also the response of the international community, European leaders can deter Chinese aggression in Taiwan.
A whole-of-NATO pivot toward Asia is coming at a time of much fear about a militarized confrontation between the United States and China over Taiwan and much uncertainty about the state of the global order post-Ukraine. As European leaders look to navigate the uncertain waters of the Taiwan Strait, they need to lean into the strengths of a united NATO and be deliberate in how they use their power. With China already wary of NATO involvement in its “domestic” affairs, European allies must recognize the sensitivity with which China views their interventions. Above all, they must ensure that their involvement presents a united signal to China: a forced reunification with Taiwan would come with great costs, but preserving peace is where NATO’s interest in China’s affairs ends.