On November 7, as China’s President Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou met, the two men were left in a somewhat uncomfortable situation. At the first meeting between the leaders of China and Taiwan in 66 years, both men strictly referred to each other as “Xiansheng” or Mister. The reason: Addressing the other as a head of state would implicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of the other country. Although the very fact that China and Taiwan agreed to meet diplomatically for the first time since the establishment of Taiwan (officially the Republic of China) is momentous, it is clear that Ma and Xi were both walking on eggshells.
The meeting was announced so abruptly and so close to next year’s Taiwanese presidential elections that Jonathan Sullivan, a Chinese Studies professor at the University of Nottingham, described it as a “Hail Mary pass with time expiring.” Even though the meeting lasted less than an hour, it was followed by an unprecedented and heavily-publicized 70-second long handshake between both leaders, causing speculation that the meeting was merely a symbolic gesture. Indeed, the meeting’s tangible outcomes are rather tenuous, but this should not lead us to dismiss it out of hand.
Xi Jinping has two compelling reasons to reshape relations with Taiwan, both of which carry implications regionally and internationally. The first is China’s fear of souring trade ties with Taiwan. Ma’s two terms have been characterized by an increased flow of economic engagement initiated by China, including an underwater pipeline transporting freshwater, a 50 percent increase in trade, and Taiwan’s recent reopening to mainland Chinese tourists. The latter drew 4 million tourists last year alone and has been described as tantamount to the United States’ normalization of relations with Cuba this year. However, despite the boom in tourism and trade that the island has experienced, Taiwan’s export-based economy has been contracting. Opposition groups, including the Sunflower Movement, have worried that China’s nearly $46 million of economic investment in Taiwan is undercutting local industries and that burgeoning trade with China is making Taiwan too dependent on its neighbor. Last March, protestors stormed the Taiwanese parliament in response to Ma’s plans for further trade expansion.
China has long pursued the policy of “buying” the approval of more volatile territories, including Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xingjiang. However, outside of China, especially in Southeast Asia and Africa, pursuing this strategy through economic investment has sometimes backfired, and the Taiwanese public’s growing discontent over trade dependency on China seems to fit with this trend. Faced with this situation, China seems to have recognized that restoring the relationship requires negotiations and concrete policy discussion, not money.
Xi’s second incentive for improving China-Taiwan relations may be connected to shared strategic interests in the South China Sea: Both countries oppose a recent decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague to adjudicate the Philippines’ challenge of China’s territorial claims in South China Sea. Both are engaged in territorial disputes with the Philippines and want to avoid international arbitration. Adding to already intense international pressure, the United States recently asserted its freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter taking a ride through the region on a US aircraft carrier.
The big question concerns Xi Jinping’s intentions. Vox explains that Xi Jinping has paradoxically combined confrontation and diplomacy as a president, provoking more territorial disputes than his predecessors but also showing more willingness to meet with leaders of countries less friendly to China. As Allen Carlson further explains, while China’s meeting with Taiwan may signal a willingness to negotiate after a period of assertiveness, it may also simply indicate China’s resolve to resist the diplomatic engagement of Washington, a longtime close ally of Taiwan. The South China Sea conflict has been extremely unique, because it not only forces China to choose between these two negotiations, but also puts China and Taiwan in a situation where they could find themselves on the same side geopolitically, opposing The Hague over territory ownership in the South China Sea. Given this, it is very possible that both countries can begin to acknowledge where their foreign policy interests align. J. Michael Cole, a prominent expert on Taiwan and China, agrees, stating that it is likely that one of Beijing’s intentions with this meeting was to demonstrate to the world that it can talk to regional partners.
However, some are more wary of China’s goals. Specifically, there has been speculation that China seeks to bolster Ma’s party, the Kuomintang (KMT), against its increasingly dominant opponent, the Democratic Progressive Policy (DPP) in Taiwan’s upcoming presidential elections. Unfortunately for the KMT, China’s attempts to influence past Taiwanese elections have failed miserably, and Ma’s policies during his two terms have stood in stark contrast to the apprehension with which many in Taiwan view China. Consequently, even though term limits prevent Ma from running again, his party’s popularity has taken a hit. The opposition candidate, Tsai Ing-Wen, is ahead by around 20 percent.
As much as various factors may have played into the surprise meeting, the situation on the ground seems relatively unchanged. This supports the argument of some analysts that Ma hoped the meeting would cement his legacy and that nothing would change barring a “grand gesture” from Xi Jinping. For instance, both countries explicitly stated that they had no intentions of establishing agreements or of holding a joint press conference. Moreover, speculation about China’s willingness to change its policy of blocking recognition of Taiwan in international organizations has appeared unfounded thus far. There was no progress on disagreement over the placement of Chinese missiles that Taiwan feels threaten its security. What is likely the most controversial facet of the meeting is the re-affirmation of the One-China Principle, wherein China and Taiwan recognize that despite the existence of two “Chinese” governments and sovereignties, there is only one Chinese state. While interpretations over the implications of this principle differ between the two nations, Ma had no qualms in agreeing with Xi’s re-affirmation that Taiwan was a province in China, not a separate country. The Taiwanese public, as indicated by the KMT’s increasing unpopularity, overwhelmingly disagrees with Ma on this principle. Needless to say, DPP challenger candidate Tsai Ing-Wen channeled the thoughts of many on the island when she stated that President Ma “did not make his people feel proud or safe” but instead created “more anxiety.”
Despite this lack of tangible outcomes, both leaders seemed pleased with what the meeting accomplished, and their impressions of what the meeting achieved were strikingly similar. Ma was open about his disapproval with Xi’s stance on security issues, but was satisfied that a dialogue had begun, stating that, “If you want to speak about achievements, the most important achievement is that the leaders across the Taiwan Strait finally met and were willing to discuss related issues.” Xi echoed that, “Today marks a new chapter in the cross-strait relationship.” In the words of The Australian, the meeting is “historic just because it is happening at all.” Portraying the meeting as a failure on the grounds that it achieved no tangible policy change is problematic, since that was never its goal. The priority was setting the baseline for future dialogue, and Xi and Ma succeeded in that regard.
Furthermore, it is probably best for now that the meeting did not radically challenge the status quo. Time magazine explains that what makes the Taiwanese issue so nebulous is that while the Taiwanese public fears being dependent on China, it is equally opposed to disavowing the mainland altogether. Only continued discussion between the two nations can balance these conflicting interests.
This holds true for whatever party wins the Taiwanese elections next year. Local Chinese officials have already held several meetings with DPP party members, and the DPP has stated that it is open to meetings if it wins the elections. This should give us hope that the precedent established at the meeting will likely be acted upon.
Of course, both sides remain intransigent with regard to several major disagreements. Nevertheless, the meeting in Singapore shows undeniable promise. China’s initiation of the meeting carries with it the implicit recognition that economic or military superiority is not enough for diplomatic success. Taiwan benefits even under the likely scenario that Tsai Ing-Wen leads the DPP to victory in January’s elections, as current trends indicate that the line of communication between China and Taiwan will not be cut soon. Despite concerns that the meeting was a display of subordination from Taiwan, President Ma has set up a situation where those most concerned about this, the opposition, will actually have a powerful avenue to voice their disagreement once in power. To say that Xi and Ma’s meeting was big can be contested, but to say that the meeting will be part of something bigger is hard to dispute.
Vox summed up China and Taiwan’s meeting best when it cautiously characterized the meeting as “not a turning point, but a landmark.” To the people of both nations, the unexpected meeting between Xi and Ma may have looked like a Hail Mary. Nevertheless, a Hail Mary is sometimes the only way you will stand a chance of winning when losing a football game. Likewise, only a direct meeting, symbolic or not, could ever make the normalization of China-Taiwan relations a possibility. And hopefully, no matter what party takes power in Taiwan next January, that dream can live on.