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No Country for Yemen: Reevaluating US military strategy in the Middle East

It’s easy to understand why the Yemeni Civil War has earned the moniker “the forgotten war.” Over the past few months, headlines about the war in Syria and the rise of ISIL have captured the international community’s attention while the deadly civil war in Yemen has languished in the public eye. Almost 3,000 civilian lives have been lost thus far in the conflict between the Zaydi Shi’a Houthi group, a subset of Shi’a Islam, and the internationally-recognized President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. But while the public may have forgotten the war in Yemen — and the human loss that comes with it — many governments remain focused on the conflict. Nations including the US, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are pouring resources into Yemen and fueling its deadly civil war. In particular, the United States has been aiding the Saudi government in trying to restore President Hadi, a US ally. The Obama Administration’s efforts to supply Saudi Arabia and its allies with both intelligence and arms — including cluster munitions and other inherently indiscriminate weapons — have elicited several moral and legal concerns surrounding US involvement in the Middle East. Furthermore, the United States’ activity in Yemen and simultaneous alliance with Saudi Arabia have been harmful to US strategic priorities within the region.

Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Yemen first began as a reaction to the rise of the Houthi militia, a group aligned with Saudi’s staunch enemy, Iran. An alliance between Houthis and troops loyal to the former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saaleh, forced President Hadi to flee the country. The US, Saudi Arabia’s ally in the conflict, has staked its interests in “defending Saudi Arabia’s border” and minimizing the impact of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), considered the most lethal branch of the terror organization.

As the civil war in Yemen developed, American and Saudi interests converged. However, amidst the Yemeni Civil War, AQAP has continued to thrive, proving to be a setback to US interests in the region. Despite the use of tactical tools such as drone strikes, the US has actually lost ground in the fight against AQAP. According to al-Qaeda expert Gregory Johnsen, a bombing campaign in April 2015 largely reversed the trend of successes against AQAP: Al-Qaeda uses American and Saudi interventions to support its anti-Western narrative, strengthen its tactical positions, attract members, and form new alliances. The Saudi-led coalition has deliberately avoided bombing AQAP-controlled areas in the hopes that the group will help to bring down the Shi’a Houthis. But as the war creates a power vacuum in many Yemeni territories, AQAP has instead gobbled up land and ISIL has gained a foothold.

Fighting AQAP is not the US’s only strategic interest in Yemen: The US is also deeply concerned with the possibility of Iranian expansion into the country. Yet, the current American approach undercuts any attempts to stop this expansionism. While the Houthis declined Iranian support early in the war, US involvement has forced the Houthis to seek Iran as an ally. “The Iranians are the only friends that the Houthis have; the Saudi war on them is only cementing that relationship,” warns Jillian Schwedler, a professor at Hunter College and Middle East expert. Since the new alliance, Iran has sent weapons and money to train Houthi soldiers, marking an important change in Iran-Houthi relations in recent years. By forcing the Houthis to accept Iranian support, the US has, in fact, helped Iranian expansionism — in direct contrast to stated strategic goals.

American policy in Yemen stands in contrast to other types of Middle Eastern involvement in the 21st Century. Instead of directly invading or organizing a coalition — as the US notoriously did with Iraq — the US has taken a back seat, allowing Saudi Arabia to decide strategy and allocate resources. Some argue that in spite of flawed American involvement in Yemen, the benefits of standing by its Saudi ally certainly outweigh any potential strategic pitfalls. However, this viewpoint fails to take into account the nuances of the US-Saudi relationship. With Saudi Arabian King Salman barely a year into his tenure, American policymakers are still developing a productive dynamic with the monarch. In the past, a heavy dependence on Saudi support throughout the region forced the US to give the royal family free reign over Yemen. Increasingly, American demands and threats directed toward the Saudis have been weak and ineffective. American support for the Saudi war effort in Yemen sets a potentially dangerous precedent in the US-Saudi relationship: If the US proves willing to support the Saudis against its own strategic interests, then Salman may feel empowered to subvert the US on other issues in the region, including Syria and oil.

Rather than protecting civilians, American-Saudi actions in Yemen have instead advanced Saudi Arabia’s power in the region, while simultaneously expanding Iranian control. If the political ramifications of increasing Saudi influence weren’t enough, US complicity in indiscriminate bombings undermines the country’s credibility as a supporter of human rights. Both the political and moral consequences of US policy in Yemen demand a change. The United States must recognize the goals of its allies and where they stand in relation to its interests. If Washington doesn’t divert its policy soon, the US just might lose itself in “the forgotten war.”

Art by Julie Benbassat

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