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Caught in the Currents

illustration by Angelina So '27, an Illustration major at RISD and Illustrator for BPR

The Cook Islands, located in the South Pacific, are known for their lush volcanic peaks, tropical beaches, and vast emerald waters. With around 17,000 inhabitants, the 15 islands boast a total land area slightly larger than Washington DC yet are strewn across a maritime territory thrice the size of Texas. The surrounding ocean contains diverse coral reefs and vast mineral deposits, but behind this idyllic picture, trouble is beginning to brew in paradise as the Cook Islands confront the dilemma of choosing between different forms of paternalism.

The Cook Islands are a nation, but they are not independent. Since 1965, the Islands have occupied a liminal space between colony and sovereign state under a Free Association agreement with New Zealand, their former colonizer. Nebulously upheld through successive partnership deals every few decades, this agreement was chosen over independence or full integration with New Zealand. While the Parliament in Avarua, the Islands’ capital, conducts its own domestic and foreign affairs, New Zealand steps in for budget support, disaster relief, and defense. 

Free Association grants Cook Islanders Kiwi citizenship, differentiated only by a special passport stamp recording their non-mainland heritage. To celebrate 60 years of Free Association this year, Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown proposed the creation of a symbolic Cook Islands passport alongside the continued use of Kiwi ones. New Zealand rejected the idea, claiming that passports (and citizenship) are only available to fully independent states. A spokesperson from the New Zealand government said a second passport would call into question the fundamental relationship between the two ‘freely associated’ states.

The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that if the Islands truly want independence, “that’s a conversation we are ready for them to initiate.” When PM Brown backtracked the proposal, he reiterated it was never meant to replace the New Zealand passport, and was instead meant to celebrate cultural identity and honor their bond to New Zealand on the anniversary of Free Association.

Brown then announced he would travel to China and sign multiple agreements, including a comprehensive strategic partnership deal, prioritizing the Islands’ economic and infrastructural development. This deal falls within China’s broader mission to expand trade and influence throughout the South Pacific. Brown initially kept the details under wraps but promised the deals would not involve loans, assuring critics that the Islands would not end up indebted to China. Now that the agreements have been released, we know the partnership deal contained a NZ$4.6 million grant and funding for education scholarships and infrastructure, such as a highly-demanded new inter-island vessel that will streamline domestic trade. The agreements also promise Chinese research collaboration into the possibility of harvesting seabed minerals, a potential multi-billion dollar industry for the Islands. Brown stated the deal should be seen as a complement to existing ties with Western powers—not a replacement. He believes it is important for all parties that the Cook Islands have a “diversified portfolio of partnerships.” 

New Zealand was appalled. Mere weeks after goading the Cook Islands into seeking independence, New Zealand is now complaining that Brown refused to show the Chinese agreements to the New Zealand government before signing and kept the details secret for weeks after. Wellington believed this secrecy violated the Free Association relationship and censured Brown in retaliation. Brown responded that he reassured Wellington “over and over” that there would be “no surprises” in the agreement that would threaten New Zealand’s security. He asserts it is within the rights of the Cook Islands’ Free Association to conduct foreign affairs with China without New Zealand “sit[ting] in the room” with them.

Wellington wants to have its cake and eat it too. Free Association came about out of necessity: New Zealand needed to follow UN guidelines for decolonization, which were adopted by the General Assembly in 1960 to facilitate self-determination for all colonized peoples. Now, New Zealand is weaponizing the Free Association to tighten its grip on the Islands’ affairs. Wellington refuses to grant Avarua’s wishes for symbolic cultural appreciation, throws a damper on their 60th anniversary celebration, and threatens to cut the Islands loose if they talk back. Then, when Avarua turns around and administers their own foreign affairs—as they are entitled to—Wellington whines that they were not given proper consideration and Avarua is ‘stepping out of line.’ These denigrating accusations illuminate a deeper nodus in the New Zealand-Cook Islands relationship: The line was unclear to begin with. 

For the last 60 years, the Cook Islands have cherished Free Association for fostering an optimal degree of autonomy. They retained the freedom to conduct their own independent affairs with the financial and military backing of a regional powerhouse. Although they are nominally less autonomous, this unique situation set the Cook Islands on a trajectory to develop beyond their fully independent neighbors. But this recent controversial success may mean the Islands are ready to shed their Kiwi training floats and swim in the South Pacific on their own. 

However, a few hundred Cook Islanders gathered in Avarua to protest against Brown, demanding he protect their special relationship with New Zealand. A member of the opposition party even introduced a vote of no confidence against him, which he survived. Critics of Brown raise a valid concern: Shedding the yoke of a former colonizer should not come at the expense of adopting a neocolonial one. China has been expanding its presence throughout the Pacific community, which is extremely important for trade, security, resource extraction, and environmental concerns. In recent years, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati signed pacts with Beijing, the details of which remain suspiciously secret. China’s growing presence in the region is concurrent with a global renegotiation of geopolitical power, with the West on the short end of the stick. The Cook Islands must be aware of the broader implications of opening their massive maritime territory to China for exclusive economic advantages—diversifying their portfolio obviously implies twisting the knife deeper as the West flounders to maintain its dominance in the South Pacific. 


Climate change also looms large over these geopolitical concerns as an existential threat to sovereignty across the South Pacific—debates about “Chinese debt traps” versus “Western paternalism” become pointless if the ocean washes all these small island countries away. Most Pacific islands are low-lying atolls and are most vulnerable to rising sea levels; some have already disappeared. Small Pacific nations often must rely on larger powers like New Zealand or China to fund their responses to climate disasters. Investment from those same powers to exploit deep sea mining could provide lucrative sources of revenue to reinvest in climate mitigation, or at least displace reliance on foreign aid after disaster strikes. Or, it might disturb the marine ecosystem, accelerate the problem, and increase damages and reliance on foreign funds. Truly only time will tell if the Cook Islands can achieve true sovereignty, and if not, who the culprit will be.

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