While the Arab Spring uprisings ignited simmering discontent across many nations in the Middle East, Western media was quick to celebrate them for symbolizing a ‘hope for democracy.’ Five years after the upheavals that transformed the political landscape of the region, Tunisia, where it all began, seems to be the last-standing token of this ‘hope’ in the eyes of the West, as Egypt slides back into autocracy while and Libya and Syria are steeped in conflict. It comes as no surprise, then, that Western countries and international organizations are eager to support what they see as democracy’s last outpost in the region, with the EU pledge of €500 million in aid, France’s offer of €1 billion, and an ongoing visit by the International Monetary Fund hinting towards new credit line negotiations.
However, labeling Tunisia the last hope for democracy in the Middle East—and throwing money at it to ostensibly finance this hope—may do more harm than good. By choosing a reductionist rhetorical binary—democratic versus non-democratic—over a more realistic engagement with the country’s complex domestic situation, politicians and Western mainstream media are silencing political dissent and civil society action in Tunisia that exist outside of the realm of the dominant political discourse, and reproduce colonialist narratives of binaries.
Five Years On
The 2011 Tunisian revolution, sparked by the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, saw mass protests across the country that eventually led to the toppling of dictator Ben Ali on January 14. Soon after, an interim government was established in February 2011 and the first democratic elections were held in October 2011. In the elections, Ennahda, an Islamist political party, gained the highest number of seats and lead the formation of a coalition government with two secular parties. In 2013, in the face of increasing discontent with this first government and following the assassinations of two prominent opposition leaders, the coalition government stood down. In January 2014, after intensive negotiations between various Tunisian political parties and unions since the 2011 ousting of Ben Ali, the new Tunisian Constitution was ratified. In October 2014, a secular umbrella party, Nidaa Tounes, was elected into government, with its leader, Beji Caid Essebsi, elected as President in December.
Without a doubt, in the five years since the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia has seen considerable, positive political change. However, this political change has been shaped by an exclusive political elite that has largely failed in its efforts to include a significant proportion of civil society in governance and reform. For instance Ennahda, Tunisia’s main Islamist political party, has largely been controlled by the same leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, and his entourage since its inception in the 1970s. The same goes for many of the political parties in Tunisia. Indeed, the incumbent President Essebsi was a member of the only recognized political party under the Ben Ali regime and many members of Nidaa Tounes were participants in the old regime.
Beyond the Political Arena: Spaces of Resistance
By maintaining influence over the country’s institutions, Tunisia’s political elite has been able to exclude other political actors and members of civil society from leadership, resulting in an increasing sense of political disconnect. This disconnect is perhaps reflected most clearly in the economic sector where levels of unemployment, a crucial driving factor for the 2011 revolution, have actually increased from approximately 13 percent before the revolution to 15.4 percent today. Deeply intertwined with the political elite are the economic elite in Tunisia resulting in the consolidation of a disconnect, not only politically but also economically, between the elite and those who are left out of political and economic processes.
In recent weeks, protests in Tunisia, particularly in southern cities such as Kasserine, have reignited and even reached the capital. If anything, these protests represent the persistent and widespread discontent with a government dominated by a political elite that continues to receive support from the West as the region’s democratic exception.
Though largely unnoticed in international media, trade unions have played a prominent role in the political process and even in the writing of the constitution, particularly with regards to worker interests. Groups such as the Tunisian General Labor Union and the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts among others have called for improved worker’s wages and battled against private interests in the Tunisian economy. Yet, these unions are increasingly leaving out the voices and demands of those currently on the streets of Tunisia as well. It is these excluded voices, particularly young an unemployed men, who have tried to gain recognition with actions such as self-immolation as a call for this recognition. Both the presence of trade unions and the ongoing protests in response to increasing unemployment rates demonstrate the variety of groups currently seeking attention in Tunisia and the complexity of the relationships between these groups, including the failures of representation in government as well as within organizations such as trade unions.
Along with these expressions of economic and, inevitably, political discontent, there are other spheres of resistance and political action such as those in the art community, including musicians such as Zomra street artists like el Seed and artist collectives such as the Twiza Collective of Tunis and Zwewla, a group who claim to “have decided to speak our mind and write the poor’s story on our walls”. These are examples of the multitude of groups and communities taking action, not only in spheres of art, to express their opinions of resistance outside of the dominant political arena, in protest of the prevalent political discourse and expanding spaces of politics.
In light of this increasing discontent, President Essebsi has launched a violent crackdown on protestors since the start of the year; in just nine days of protests in January 2016, over 1000 demonstrators were arrested. The tragic terror attacks that occurred in Tunisia in 2015 have contributed to an increased focus on security, but the resulting ‘state of emergency’ has brought with it government powers that have been used to despotically silence political opposition more broadly and justify violent crackdowns.
Reductionist Portrayals and Implications for the Region
A reductionist portrayal of Tunisia as a laudable and exceptional democracy overlooks those left out of the democratic process, as well as violence by the government against protestors and marginalized groups. Admittedly, Tunisia has made commendable changes, particularly in regards to its democracy in the past five years. But the predominant portrayal of Tunisia as a beacon of exemplary democracy in the Middle East needs to be deconstructed, particularly given the failure of political inclusion and the increasingly violent government response to new forms of resistance and political expression.
For many Western nations, praising the democratic hope and the ignoring of the complexity of the Tunisian situation serves strategic geopolitical purposes since Tunisia is a vital, stable ally in the region. The recent promises of financial support from actors such as the European Union and France arrive concurrently with increasing state aggression and oppression, which shows that entities such as the EU have little interest in democracy, but are instead more interested in power and continued influence in regional politics.
The reductionist narrative of Tunisia produced in the West simplifies the politics and civil society dynamics of the country, and ultimately abets the silencing of alternative forms of political expression for the sake of furthering geopolitical control.