The Waiting Game

This was not always the Obama administration’s policy. Just two years ago, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined the U.S. foreign policy focus for the 21st century. Coining the phrase “pivot to Asia,” Clinton sought to redefine U.S. foreign priorities in an era when Asia is increasingly economically pertinent. This strategy marked a departure from traditional U.S. foreign policy, which had until then been primarily concerned with ties and developments in Europe and the Middle East. The proposed pivot sought to give the United States an early advantage in forming strong relations with a region on the rise. Many Asian leaders welcomed the rebalancing of the U.S. strategic imperative.

Fast forward to 2014, however, and the picture is remarkably different. Asian leaders are beginning to openly question  American diplomatic and economic commitments to the region. Concern over the United States’ lack of participation is symptomatic of a greater unease surrounding China’s escalating regional dominance. While American presence was presumed to be a counterbalancing force against China’s strength, China has continued to grow as the United States has shifted its focus back towards the Middle East.

Perhaps Clinton promised too much when she penned her pivotal article in Foreign Policy. In it she highlighted six key tenets of the pivot: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening the United States’ working relationships with emerging powers, including China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights. Yet the article’s unwritten objective of keeping China in check, which initially drew support from other Asian leaders, is now the subject of great scrutiny. Clinton rejects the notion that America seeks to constrain China and its growth, focusing instead on the economic and diplomatic strategy of counterbalancing, rather than the military strategy of containment. However, most foreign policy observers agree that containment is the aspect of the pivot that has materialized most convincingly. By 2020, the United States is projected to shift 60 percent of its naval assets and overseas-based air force to the Asia-Pacific region, and transfers have already been taking place as the United States places several of the Navy’s newest ships in Singapore. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates subtly implied China was the reason for the move.

While the United States eagerly engaged the region in the year following the pivot’s launch, diplomatic enthusiasm has now cooled — a shift marked by the State Department’s change of staff. Clinton memorably made her first trip as secretary of state to Asia, but her successor, John Kerry, chose instead to begin his term with a tour of nine European and Middle Eastern countries. This signaled Kerry’s divergent set of priorities, the list of which is crowned by an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. Furthermore, the Syrian civil war and overtures made by Iran to mend its soured relationship with the United States have demanded much of Kerry’s attention, reinforcing the Middle Eastern theme of U.S. foreign policy.

Given that Kerry simply does not seem to be as skilled a diplomat as Clinton, Asian leaders’ concerns with his neglect of their region are understandable. In 2012, China flew state aircraft into disputed airspace for the first time since 1958, angering Japan, which claimed the same area. Clinton, still secretary of state at that time, warned the Chinese off and issued a strong statement against “any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration.” Just after Clinton stepped down in January 2013, a Chinese military frigate allegedly locked its weapon-targeting radar on a Japanese naval vessel. Barely days into his job, Secretary Kerry hardly provided a reassuring statement to the Japanese. Without rhetorical support — and with U.S. interests drifting away — America’s Asian allies have been left to face a changing Asia on their own.

In addition to diplomatic neglect, the United States’ unconvincing pivot to Asia has disappointed Asian nations economically. President Obama’s absence at the 2013 Asia-Pacific Economic Conference in Bali, Indonesia tellingly drew criticism from Asian leaders. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak said the United States had missed out on a “golden opportunity…to show leadership in that context of the new emphasis towards Asia,” while Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong called Obama’s absence a “great disappointment.” Moreover, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations proposed by President Obama, which will see 12 nations profit from enhanced trade and investment, have been progressing at a sluggish pace. Talks with the proposed trade partners have yet to be concluded and there is no foreseeable end date for the deal, as the Obama administration lacks Congressional support for the bill.

Yet while the United States holds back, China is vying for control of Asia. In an era when fear of China and its potential is building in the United States, it is prudent to realize that a half-hearted version of the pivot to Asia only concedes control to the state with the most territory, biggest economy and strongest military in the region. The Obama administration has sought to reassure China that the pivot is economic, not militaristic, but nevertheless, China’s suspicions surrounding American intentions are an open secret. Xinhua, the state press agency, interpreted the pivot as “trying to drive a wedge between China and some of its Southeast Asian neighbors, which have enjoyed ‘20 years of steady friendship.’”

Given the new American ambivalence, the Chinese have seized the lead in asserting regional hegemony. In 2013, Beijing declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that overlapped with the Taiwanese and South Korean ADIZs. China’s new ADIZ also includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are at the heart of a dispute with the Japanese. This latest act of belligerence comes as part of a series of protracted conflicts between China and its East Asian neighbors, Japan and South Korea. It’s also the event that prompted Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s provocative comparison to World War I. Incidentally, the United States has individual mutual defense treaties with both Japan and South Korea, which require it to support them in a conflict if that conflict is provoked by a third-party aggressor. Allowing China to define the status quo in the region, especially when the United States could be drawn into a war, is hardly in the nation’s best interests.

Lacking strong U.S. support, many countries will have to stand alone against China’s aggressive regional policies. In July 2013, Japan exacerbated tensions in the region with its Defense White Paper. This was postured as a response to the Chinese military frigate’s locking of its weapon-targeting radar on a Japanese naval vessel. Japan alleged that China had “attempted to change the status quo by force based on its own assertion, which is incompatible with the existing order of international law.”

This is not merely tough rhetoric from the Japanese government. Across the region, nations have allocated increasingly larger portions of their budgets to military expenditures. In the past three years, defense spending in the Asia-Pacific region has grown by 9.4 percent, with a significant 4.7 percent increase in 2013 alone. China has contributed to most of this growth, increasing its military spending last year by over 6 percent. This year, its defense budget is forecasted to eclipse that of France, Britain and Germany combined, sparking fears of China’s potential use of force in regional disputes. Military spending across the region has increased to counterbalance this, giving rise to a vicious circle.

Without a convincing U.S. response to standoffs, the ball will soon be in China’s court to craft the parameters of regional foreign policy. And if the United States becomes further disengaged from the region, China’s neighbors will be in for a truly tough time. Manila learned this the hard way after Typhoon Haiyan wrecked the Philippines. While the United States and Japan pledged $37 and $10 million in relief assistance respectively, China initially provided a measly $100,000 in cash. Even after an international outcry, Beijing only increased its humanitarian aid to $1.6 million — significantly less than the $2.7 million Ikea offered.

The disparity between the aid packages is but one difference between China and its neighbors — as increased military jockeying shows. Military experts agree that, if anything, the ballooning defense budgets and continued series of conflicts in the region bring amplified opportunities for contact between the various militaries, exponentially increasing the chances of an accidental confrontation. Such a confrontation — especially if it included major powers like China and Japan — could have global consequences. Although it seems unlikely that the world’s second and third largest economies would risk their material growth for nationalistic pride, the region is still in need of a calming influence to check the current rapid militarization. This is the perfect opportunity for the United States to reassert its pivot. But while a firm pivot would allow it to contend with China, the United States would also need to ease the friction between its close allies, Japan and South Korea. The two East Asian neighbors are locked in yet another territorial dispute over a chain of islets, known as Dokdo to the Koreans and Takeshima to the Japanese. Their antagonistic history has made American mediation all but necessary.

On the economic front, delays in American TPP negotiations have opened up a new window of opportunity for intra-regional economic collaboration. Both China and Japan are courting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose combined GDP is already larger than India’s — despite having a population just half its size. In 2013 alone, both China’s President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang met with ASEAN leaders. They have proposed improving the terms of the existing China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, while floating the notion of a “community of common destiny,” rhetorically highlighting that China is committed to the region for the long haul. Japan wasn’t going to miss the party. Abe bettered his Chinese counterparts by personally visiting all 10 ASEAN countries in a calendar year and pledging an additional $1.65 billion in overseas development assistance and investment loans, reminding international observers of Japan’s largely understated regional influence.

All this has ASEAN leaders quietly pleased with the state of international affairs. While Vietnam and Malaysia continue to have territorial spats with China, they are relatively small players in the South China Sea dispute, which now seems more likely to be shelved than resolved. China will not want to risk angering its newly-courted partners, especially when they could easily turn to the United States and the free trade bill it has proposed.

The ASEAN as an organization has always been cautious about declaring political loyalties, preferring to maintain a solid policy of nonalignment. Barely five years after its formation, ASEAN leaders affirmed the Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, stating that Southeast Asia should be “free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers.” As Singaporean Prime Minister Lee put it, the ASEAN would “like to have [their] cake and eat it.” In the same tradition as the United States, Japan and China’s recent generosity indicates that economic assistance is clearly used as a means of capturing political loyalty. This latest courtship will be a stern test of the association’s resolve.

But underlying the region’s calm is a bed of uncertainty. China, Japan and, more reluctantly, the United States are all jockeying for power. Amidst the flurry of activity, the ASEAN member states are waiting for a firm American response. Despite American reticence, the United States maintains an advantage in the game that Japan and, more importantly, China, do not possess. Given its geographical distance, economic largess, and status as a dominant world power, it can bide its time before providing a robust reinvigoration of the pivot.

It is difficult to say, though, how long the ASEAN states’ patience will last. Recently, President of the Philippines Benigno S. Aquino III insinuated a comparison between China and Hitler, alluding to Chinese control of the Scarborough Shoal, despite an agreement stating that both parties should withdraw until the status of its ownership was decided. He noted that the “Sudetenland was given in an attempt to appease Hitler to prevent World War II.” But Aquino’s concern is not necessarily representative of all ASEAN states, since he is undoubtedly trying to rally the world’s support for the Filipino cause. Once a more neutral ASEAN leader — one who’s not directly involved in a conflict with China — sounds the alarm, China will have grave cause for concern. So far, all such players have maintained the ASEAN veil of neutrality.

Due to its proximity to the ASEAN member states, China cannot play the same waiting game as the United States, but it can influence how long the patience of the ASEAN states will last. Should the Chinese continue to adopt military policies that contradict their economic efforts, they will only accelerate the process of turning their Asian neighbors towards the United States. With China’s track record of being unafraid to act unilaterally and impose its will on its neighbors, the region is wary of Chinese dominance. It might take China years to build up a benevolent image that inspires its neighbors’ trust, but if it does, the United States may lose its influential edge.

The United States cannot afford to wait long for signs of trouble to appear before making a concerted effort to shore up the pivot. The lack of trouble is precisely what may drive Asian allies to more Sino-friendly foreign policy. ASEAN nations may soon decide that hedging their bets on an ambivalent America is not in their long-term interests, especially in an era of Western fiscal austerity. The U.S. defense budget has tellingly been in decline since 2011, when it peaked at just under $700 billion. This year, it is forecasted to be $612.4 billion, with Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel planning to shrink the Army to pre-WWII levels.

Washington is steadily losing the luxury of time. China’s dominance is not only pushing other nations into more radical actions that could drag the United States into wars, it is also solidifying its economic relations and building trust with other Asian countries. The United States has too many key interests in the region to contemplate pulling out just yet, and Obama needs to develop a comprehensive strategy to win back Asian-Pacific leaders before a new regional hierarchy emerges. Unless the United States switches tracks, the coming shift in power will leave it behind. Even if Secretary Kerry started booking more trips to the East, reasserting the American pivot to Asia will not be an easy feat. Hillary Clinton, while still secretary of state, famously mused in a document released by WikiLeaks: “How do you deal toughly with your banker?”

I Naishad Kai-ren ’17 is a history concentrator.

Art by Goyo Kwon